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TWO FATHERS, ONE DAD: ALLOCATING THE PATERNAL
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE MEN INVOLVED IN THE
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PROCESS
by
Browne Lewis
This Article deals with the allocation of paternity between the men
involved in the artificial insemination process. The Article explores the
manner in which the courts determine the identity of the father of a child
conceived by artificial insemination. If a man is financially responsible
for a child during his lifetime, that child is usually classified as his heir
if he dies intestate. Once an artficially conceived child is permitted to
inherit from his or her father, the issue that must be resolved is: from
which 'father" does the child have the legal right to inherit? There are
two possible answers to this question. The child may have the right to
inherit from the husband of his or her mother or from the man who
donated the sperm that resulted in his or her conception.
The current paternal statutory scheme is inadequate to address the legal
consequences resulting from the existence of artificially created children
because it focuses too much on protecting the reproductive rights of the
men involved in the process and ignores the needs of the children that are
conceived. Instead offocusing exclusively upon the man's right to choose
whether or not to be a parent, the state legislatures should take steps to
ensure that the artificially conceived child has at least two adults who
are legally responsible to provide financial support for the child. That
goal can be achieved by expanding the definition of 'father" to include
men who are not linked to the child by biology or adoption. I propose that
fatherhood should be redefined to promote the best interests of the
artificially conceived child.
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I. INTRODUCTION
According to one court, "'fatherhood' or 'paternity' is a legally,
socially, and politically defined relationship, not a biological fact."1 A
father is the man who supplies the genetic material used to create the
child. A dad is the man who teaches the child to ride a bike. As a
consequence of the advances in reproductive technology, the same man
may not play both of those roles. Nonetheless, the law's failure to keep
up with those advances may result in neither man playing the role. This
Article deals with the allocation of paternity between the men involved in
the artificial insemination process. The objective should be to allocate
paternity in a manner that resolves the "legally fatherless child" problem.
In 2005, a Tennessee Supreme Court justice stated, "We now live in
an era where a child may have as many as five different 'parents.' These
include a sperm donor, an egg donor, a surrogate or gestational host,
and two nonbiologically related individuals who intend to raise the
child., 2 The court opined that the state's parentage statutes were
ineffective because the legislature did not "contemplate many of the
scenarios now made possible by recent developments in reproductive
technology.,
3
Further medical advances have been made since 2005. Hence, it may
now be possible for at least six persons to owe parental obligations to one
child.4 Consider the following scenario. Married couple A and B contract
with C to conceive a child using assisted reproduction technology.
Neither A nor B is able to contribute genetic material for the procedure,
so C is impregnated with sperm donated by D, a family friend of A and B,
and eggs donated by E. C's husband, F, consents to the procedure. A and
B are the intended parents, so they may be considered the legal parents
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.Jan. 18,1991).
2 In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 721 (Tenn. 2005).
3 Id.
' Howard Fink & June Carbone, Between Private Ordering and Public Fiat: A New
Paradigm for Family Law Decision-making, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 37-38 (2003); see also
Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional
Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 602 (2002) (opining that a child
conceived using assisted reproductive technology may have as many as eight
recognized parents); Colette Archer, Comment, Scrambled Eggs: Defining Parenthood
and Inheritance Rights of Children Born of Reproductive Technology, 3 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
152, 164 (2002).
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of the child. E's egg contributed to the conception of the child. Thus,
she is the child's biological parent.6 C is the child's gestational mother, so
she may be recognized as the child's legal parent.7 The child was
conceived during C's marriage to F and F consented to the procedure.
Hence, F may be recognized as the child's legal father." Finally, as a
known sperm donor who contributed to the creation of the child, D is
the child's biological father and may also be deemed the child's legal
father." Courts faced with these types of scenarios have used their best
efforts to resolve the cases before them and implored the legislatures to
act. In particular, one court stated, "We urge the.., legislature to enact
laws that are responsive to these problems in order to safeguard the
interests of children born as a result of assisted reproductive
technology.""' Legislatures have been slow to respond to the judicial plea
for guidance.
When the statutory system allocating paternal responsibility was
created, a family consisted of a man, a woman, and their children.
Sexual intercourse and adoption were the main methods of creating a
family. Procreation is no longer the exclusive domain of the traditional
family. 2 The current paternal statutory scheme is inadequate to address
the legal consequences resulting from the existence of artificially
conceived children because it focuses too much on protecting the
reproductive rights of the men involved in the process and ignores the
needs of the children who are conceived. Under the majority of state
artificial insemination statutes, the question asked is: Has the man
consented to be a legal parent by written agreement or by his actions?
"'Intended parents' means a man and a woman, married to each other, who enter
into an agreement with a surrogate under the terms of which they will be the parents
of any child born to the surrogate through assisted conception regardless of the
genetic relationships between the intended parents, the surrogate, and the child." VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008).
6 See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(stating that the traditional surrogate is the child's genetic mother).
' "'Gestational mother' means the woman who gives birth to a child, regardless
of her genetic relationship to the child." § 20-156; See also In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d at
730 (holding the gestational carrier to be the legal mother of the artificially
conceived child).
See In reK.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1033 (Kan. 2007).
See Mintz v. Zoernig, 198 P.3d 861, 864 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
'0 In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 150 (Ill. 2003); See also In re C.K.G., 173
S.W.3d at 731.
" See Barbara J. Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits
Through Litigation, Legislation and Collective Bargaining, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 93, 93-97
(2000) (discussing the protected legal status of the traditional nuclear family).
12 See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 122 (Md. 2007) ("What had not been
fathomed exists today. The methods by which people can produce children have
changed; the option of having children is now available, using these methods, to
people who, otherwise, would not be able to have children.").
[Vol. 13:4
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The question that should be asked is: Is it in the best interest of the child
that the man be considered the legal parent?
3
Instead of focusing exclusively upon the man's right to choose
whether or not to be a parent, the state legislatures should take steps to
ensure that the artificially conceived child has at least two adults who are
legally responsible to provide financial support for the child. This
approach will promote our current public policy of protecting the
interests of children. That public policy concern has led to legislative
action which includes establishing mechanisms for non-marital children
to inherit from their fathers14 and giving preference to children over
parents under the intestacy system. In order to accomplish that goal,
state legislatures should recognize more than one class of fathers and
allocate paternal responsibility based upon the best interests of the
artificially conceived child.
Thirty-four states have statutes addressing the legal status of children
conceived with the use of assisted reproductive technology. 6 Most of the
statutes deal exclusively with artificial insemination. 7 That means that
sixteen state legislatures have not taken any action to address the legal
issues resulting from the existence of artificially conceived children. The
statutes that exist establish the parental rights of the inseminated
woman's husband and the parental status of the non-spousal sperm
donor. The legislatures that have enacted those statutes have created a
regime that is based upon an outdated view of the American family. For
example, the statutes were enacted to address situations occurring in
marriages, but do not address single parents. Only the drafters of the
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) and the legislators from the states of
Texas and Wyoming have attempted to acknowledge the experiences of
persons who are not husband and wife.' 9 Most state legislatures have
ignored the fact that unmarried women are choosing to be artificially
" See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents' Rights, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 1747, 1749 (1993) (advocating that a family law
focus upon the interests of children instead of solely emphasizing the rights of
parents).
'4 See Karen A. Hauser, Comment, Inheritance Rights for Extramarital Children: New
Science Plus Old Intermediate Scrutiny Add Up to the Need for Change, 65 U. CIN. L. REv.
891,931 (1997).
'5 See Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills,
22 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 917, 920 (1989).
16 The components of those statutes will be discussed later in the Article.
" Helen M. Alvar , The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children's
Rights Perspective, 40 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 1, 26-27 (2003).
'8 UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 4 (Supp. 2009).
"9 See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.7031(a) (Vernon 2008) ("Ifan unmarried man,
with the intent to be the father of a resulting child, provides sperm to a licensed
physician and consents to the use of that sperm for assisted reproduction by an
unmarried woman, he is the father of a resulting child."). The Wyoming statute
applies to married and unmarried persons. The consent must be signed by the
woman and the man who plans to parent the child. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-904(a)
(2009).
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inseminated without the benefit of marriage or that same-sex couples are
choosing to use artificial insemination to create their families.2 0 Even the
states that have been progressive enough to recognize same sex
marriages or civil unions have not included unmarried women in the
21scope of their artificial insemination statutes.
In order for a child to inherit under the intestacy statute, there must
22be a legally recognized parent-child relationship. Most of the litigation
surrounding this issue focuses upon the child's ability to inherit from his
or her father's estate. Thus, this Article deals solely with the paternal
obligations of the men involved in the artificial insemination procedure.
In particular, the Article examines the circumstances under which the
man has a duty to financially support the artificially conceived child.
Once the law recognizes the existence of a father-child relationship for
child support purposes, the child is given the opportunity to inherit from
his or her father. Therefore, it is possible to speculate about the impact
the existence of artificially conceived children will have on the intestacy
system.
Children born during the marriage are considered legitimate
because they are of the marriage. As a result, those children do not have
to establish the existence of a father-child relationship to inherit from
their fathers. In situations where the child's conception results from
sexual intercourse between a man and a woman, the child's legal status
with regards to inheritance is easily determined. Things become more
complicated when a child is conceived using reproductive technology
like artificial insemination. Nonetheless, if the child is born during the
marriage, even if there is no biological connection to the inseminated
20 Fink & Carbone, supra note 4, at 54-55.
21 Currently, same-sex couples are given marital rights or similar rights in
California, Hawaii, Massachusetts and Vermont. ABA Section of Family Law, A White
Paper: An Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic
Partnerships, 38 FAM L.Q. 339, 347 (2004). With regards to those states' treatment of
artificial insemination, see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2004); and
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 2009). Hawaii has not enacted a statute
dealing with the parental obligations of the men involved in the artificial
insemination process. Although Vermont does not have an artificial insemination
statute, the Vermont Supreme Court's reasoning in Miller-Jenkins v. MillerJenkins,
indicates that the Court would apply such a statute to same-sex couples who had
entered into a civil union. 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006).
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7601 (West 2004) ("'Parent and child relationship' ...
means the legal relationship existing between a child and the child's natural or
adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges,
duties, and obligations. The term includes the mother and child relationship and the
father and child relationship."); see also Sol Lovas, When is a Family Not a Family?
Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance Within the Non-Traditional Family, 24 IDAHO L.
REv. 353, 381 (1988).
23 Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part II. Questioning the Paternity of Marital
Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 55, 55-56 (2003).
954 [Vol. 13:4
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woman's husband, the court may still obligate the husband to provide
support for the child.24
The majority of state legislatures have not enacted statutes that deal
specifically with the inheritance rights of artificially conceived children.
This Article addresses the obligations of the men involved in the
conception of children conceived by the use of assisted reproduction2 6 or
assisted conception.27 The legal issues that arise as a consequence of
surrogacy or gestational agreements are beyond the scope of this
Article.28 Therefore, the issues addressed in this Article are limited to
those impacting children conceived as a result of artificial insemination
29
as it is defined in several state statutes.
Part II of this Article includes a brief discussion of the artificial
insemination process. If a man is financially responsible for a child
during his lifetime, that child is usually classified as his heir if he dies
intestate. Once an artificially conceived child is permitted to inherit from
his or her father, the issue that must be resolved is: From which "father"
does the child have the legal right to inherit? There are two possible
answers to this question. The child may have the right to inherit from the
24 See Laura G. v. Peter G., 830 N.Y.S.2d 496, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
25 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209(c) (2004) ("Any child conceived following
artificial insemination of a married woman with the consent of her husband shall be
treated as their child for all purposes of intestate succession. Consent of the husband
is presumed unless the contrary is shown by clear and convincing evidence."); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-777(a) (West 2004) ("A child born as a result of A.I.D. may
inherit the estate of his mother and her consenting spouse ... and he shall not
inherit the estate from his natural father or his relatives."); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-5
(West 2003) ("An individual conceived by artificial insemination and presumed
legitimate ... shall be considered a child of the parents and entitled to inherit tinder
the laws of intestacy from the parents and from relatives of the parents, and the
parents and relatives of the parents shall likewise be entitled to inherit as heirs from
and through such individual.").
2 "'Assisted reproduction' means a method of causing pregnancy other than
sexual intercourse. The term includes: a. Intrauterine insemination; b. Donation of
eggs; c. Donation of embryos; d. In vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; and e.
Intracytoplasmic sperm injection." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-02 (Supp. 2009).
27 UNIr. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 1(1), 9C U.L.A. 368
(2001) ("'Assisted conception' means a pregnancy resulting from (i) fertilizing an
egg of a woman with sperm of a man by means other than sexual intercourse or (ii)
implanting an embryo, but the term does not include the pregnancy of a wife
resulting from fertilizing her egg with sperm of her husband.").
2" This Article is limited to artificial insemination because the state statutes
dealing with the relevant paternal obligations deal solely with artificial insemination
and not other forms of assisted reproduction. See In re Parentage of J.M.K., 119 P.3d
840, 849 (Wash. 2005) (holding that artificial insemination statute did not apply to
situations involving in vitro fertilization).
2 "'Artificial insemination' means introduction of semen of a donor... into a
woman's vagina, cervical canal or uterus through the use of instruments or other
artificial means." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5401 (2002). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3111.88 (West 2005); Justyn Lezin, (Mis)Conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally
Unmarried Women's Access to Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known Donors, 14
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 190 (2003).
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husband of his or her mother or from the man who donated the sperm
that resulted in his or her conception. During a marriage, if a woman is
artificially inseminated with her husband's sperm, the resulting child is
treated as if it was conceived by sexual intercourse . 3  Thus, the
inheritance issue is easily resolved.
Relying upon a review of the relevant state statutes, in Part III, I
analyze the circumstances under which a married man may be obligated
to support an artificially conceived child to whom he has no biological
connection. Part IV focuses upon the legal obligations placed upon non-
spousal sperm donors." Part V attempts to identify the deficiencies in the
current state statutory system. Part VI consists of an analysis of the UPA's
approach. Part VII offers some suggestions for improving the capacity of
the current legal regime to deal with the paternal obligations of the men
involved in the artificial insemination process. In the final part of this
Article, Part IX, I lay out my proposal for redefining fatherhood to
promote the best interests of artificially conceived children.
II. THE PROCESS OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
In order to comprehend the premise of this Article, it is not
necessary to have a thorough understanding of the science behind the
artificial insemination process. Therefore, I will only briefly discuss the
process. The artificial insemination process was originally performed on
domestic animals. 32 This is not surprising because most medical
procedures are perfected by using animals as test subjects. Consequently
artificial insemination is the oldest and most commonly used form of
assisted reproduction.3
" Daryl L. Gordon-Ceresky, Note, Artificial Insemination: Its Effect on Paternity and
Inheritance Rights, 9 CONN. PROB L.J. 245, 246 (1995).
31 In most jurisdictions, husbands are not considered donors for purposes of
artificial insemination. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-02-8(a) (Supp. 2009)
("'Donor' means an individual who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted
reproduction, whether or not for consideration. The term does not include: a. A
husband who provides sperm, or a wife who provides eggs, to be used for assisted
reproduction by the wife. ); See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.88(B) (West
2005) ("'Donor' means a man who supplies semen for a non-spousal artificial
insemination.").
32 Martin Richards, Genes, Genealogies and Paternity: Making Babies in the Twenty-first
Century, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 53, 55 UR Spencer
& Antje du Bois-Pedain eds., 2006). Some states still have statutes regulating the use
of artificial insemination in animals. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 25-803 (2000) ("It is
unlawful for any person to practice artificial insemination of domestic animals unless
he shall first obtain a license so to do as provided in this act. Provided, no license
shall be required of or by any person to perform artificial insemination upon his own
domestic animals.").
" Elizabeth A. Bryant, Comment, In the Interest of R.C., Minor Child: The
Colorado Artificial Insemination by Donor Statute and the Non-Traditional Family, 67 DEN.
U. L. REx'. 79, 79 (1990).
[Vol. 13:4
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Procreation usually occurs when a woman's egg is fertilized by sperm
inserted in her body through sexual intercourse. That process is called
natural insemination. A woman is artificially inseminated whenever
34
sperm is inserted into her body using something other than a penis .
There are numerous reasons why a woman might choose to reproduce
using artificial insemination. For example, when her male companion is
infertile or impotent, a woman will not be able to become pregnant
through natural insemination. Hence, to achieve her goal of conception,
the woman may decide to try artificial insemination. Moreover, in some
cases, artificial insemination is used when a woman in a same-sex
relationship desires to get pregnant.
35
The artificial insemination process involves the injection of sperm
near the woman's cervix." The procedure may be done by a licensed
physician in a medical facility or by a woman at home with a turkey
baster.3' Medically, there are three main types of artificial insemination.
The classification of the type of artificial insemination involved depends
upon the source of the sperm inserted into the woman. If the woman's
husband contributes the sperm that are implanted, the process is called
homologous insemination. That type of insemination may also be
referred to as artificial insemination by husband (AIH). 41 Initially, this
was the only type of artificial insemination performed by doctors. This
type of artificial insemination is not the focus of this Article.
More and more women are choosing to be inseminated with sperm
donated by men with whom they do not have a relationship. The
procedure involving the use of donor sperm is heterologous
" Machelle M. Seibel, Understanding the Medical Procedures and Terminology
Surrounding Reproductive Technology, in ADOPTION AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY LAw
IN MASSACHUSET'S 411, 415 (Susan L. Crockin ed., 2000).
s3 CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN McBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAw YER's GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE § 2.3, at 33-34 (2006)
(listing key reasons women choose to get artificially inseminated).
36 John A. Gibbons, Comment, Who's Your Daddy?: A Constitutional Analysis of Post-
Mortem Insemination, 14J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 187, 192 (1997).
37 Maria J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-Gay
Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 183, 204
(1995).
" Sheri Gilbert, Note, Fatherhood from the Grave: An Analysis of Postmortem
Insemination, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 521, 526-27 (1993).
39 Barbara K. Padgett, Note, Illegitimate Children Conceived by Artifcial Insemination:
Does Some State Legislation Deny Them Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment?,
32 U. LOUISVILLEJ. FAM. L. 511, 516-17 (1993).
40 Cindy L. Steeb, Note, A Child Conceived After His Father's Death?: Posthumous
Reproduction and Inheritance Rights. An Analysis of Ohio Statutes, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 137,
140 (2000).
41 Id.
41 Inseminating a woman with the sperm of a man who was not her husband was
highly controversial. Sandi Varnado, Comment, Who's Your Daddy?: A Legitimate
Question Given Louisiana's Lack of Legislation Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology,
66 LA. L. REv. 609, 615-16 (2006).
20091
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43insemination or artificial insemination by donor(AID). In some cases, a
doctor may inseminate a woman with a mixture consisting of a
combination of her husband's sperm and sperm from a donor. That
process is called confused artificial insemination . The focus of this
Article is upon the paternal obligations of the men involved in the
artificial insemination process when the woman is inseminated with
donor sperm. The next Part explores the parental responsibility of the
inseminated woman's husband.
III. PATERNAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE HUSBANDS
This Part deals with non-spousal insemination situations where a
married woman is inseminated with sperm donated by a man who is not
46her husband. The legal issue becomes: is the child the legitimate heir of
the woman's husband? If the child is classified as legitimate, the child has
the right to inherit from the man who was married to the child's mother
at the time of the artificial insemination. Under the common law, the
child would be in the class of heirs if the child was conceived during the
marriage.4 ' The states that have enacted statutes addressing the status of
children conceived by artificial insemination have taken different routes
to arrive at the same answer-the child is the legitimate child of the
woman's husband. Thus, the child has the right to inherit from and
48through that man.
A. The Husband Agrees to Be the Father
In most jurisdictions, if the husband does not consent in writing to
the artificial insemination of his wife, he is not responsible for providing
financial support to the resulting child.49 Hence, it follows that the child
4' Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way to Be Born? Legislative Inaction and the
Posthumous Child, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 993, 997 (1996).
44 Janet J. Berry, Life After Death: Preservation of the Immortal Seed, 72 TUL. L. REV.
231, 236 (1997).
45 "'Non-spousal artificial insemination' means an artificial insemination of a
woman with the semen of a man who is not her husband." O-nio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3111.88(C) (West 2005).
46 This is referred to as heterologous artificial insemination (A.I.D.). Padgett,
supra note 39, at 516.
, See GDK v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 92 P.3d 834, 835 (Wyo. 2004); ALA.
CODE § 26-17-204(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) ("A man is presumed to be the father
of a child if: (1) he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the
child is born during the marriage .. ").
48 Once the father-child relationship is recognized, the child has the right to
inherit under the intestacy system. Peter Wendel, Inheritance Rights and the Step-Partner
Adoption Paradigm: Shades of the Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children, 34 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 351, 358 & n.32 (2005).
49 E.g., KS. v. G.S., 440 A.2d 64, 66 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981). See also In re
Marriage of Witbeck-Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122, 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding
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would not be entitled to inherit from the nonconsenting husband. A few
states require that the writing indicating the man's consent be executed
and acknowledged. 50 Nonetheless, some courts have stated that consent is
not limited to written consent. Thus, a man may become responsible for
the artificially conceived child as a result of his actions. 51 Further, some
state statutes mandate that the husband consent to the artificial
insemination without specifically requiring that the consent be in
writing.52 Under the Arkansas statute, if the husband does not submit
convincing evidence indicating otherwise, he is presumed to have
consented to the insemination of his wife. 5'3 The UPA and at least one
state permit a husband to avoid responsibility for the child by
withdrawing his consent. 5 The husband has the burden of proving that
he withdrew his consent. The husband's legal duty to support the child
may also be eliminated by dissolution of the marriage5 6 or the death of
57the husband prior to the child's conception. If the woman is able to
show that her husband consented in some manner to her being
artificially inseminated, he will be legally recognized as the father of the
artificially created child.
that it is against public policy to require a man to provide financial support for a child
his wife conceives by artificial insemination without his consent).
'o See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3 (West 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-130
(2007); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 73(2) (McKinney Supp. 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 553 (West 2007).
5 See, e.g., In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 879 (S.C. 1987) ("Husband's consent
to his wife's impregnation by artificial insemination may be express, or it may be
implied from conduct which evidences knowledge of the procedure and failure to
object." (citing R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 923 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983))). See also Karen De
Haan, Note, Whose Child Am I? A Look at How Consent Affects a Husband's Obligation to
Support a Child Conceived Through Heterologous Artificial Insemination, 37 BRANDEIS L.J.
809, 812-14 (1999).
2 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAwS SERV. § 333.2824(6)
(LexisNexis 2005); MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 2009).
5' ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209 (2004).
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002) § 706(b), 9B U.L.A. 65 (Supp. 2009)
("The consent of a former spouse to assisted reproduction may be withdrawn by that
individual in a record at any time before placement of... sperm...."). See also
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 194-106(7) (b) (2008).
5 SeeJackson v.Jackson, 739 N.E.2d 1203, 1213 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
5 See UNIE. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002) § 706(a), 9B U.L.A. 65 (Supp. 2009)
("If a marriage is dissolved before placement of ... sperm..., the former spouse is
not a parent of the resulting child unless the former spouse consented in a record
that if assisted reproduction were to occur after a divorce, the former spouse would
be a parent of the child."). See also COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-4-106(7)(a) (2008); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-158(C) (2008).
5' UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002) § 707, 9B U.L.A. 66 (Supp. 2009) ("If a
spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased spouse is not
a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that
if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a
parent of the child.").
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1. Written Consent
As a matter of public policy, the state of Connecticut has declared
that if a woman has a child during wedlock, that child is legitimate. 8
According to the statute, the public policy considerations are relevant to
situations involving children born as a result of artificial insemination .
To that end, the Connecticut legislature enacted a statute specifically
stating that children conceived by artificial insemination should be
legally treated as if they had been naturally conceived. Therefore, the
artificially conceived child is the legitimate child of the husband of the
inseminated woman as long as the husband consented to the
procedure. 60 The procedure must be performed by a licensed physician"
who must acquire the husband's written consent.62 Once written proof of
the husband's consent has been filed with the probate court," the
artificially conceived child has the legal right to inherit from his or her
mother's husband's estate, even though a biological connection does not
exists between the child and the husband. 64
Connecticut is not alone in its treatment of artificially conceived
children. A significant number of other states also mandate that the
procedure be performed by or under the supervision of a licensed
physician 65 and that the husband consent in writing to the artificial
" CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-771 (a) (West 2004) ("It is declared that the
public policy of this state has been an adherence to the doctrine that every child born
to a married woman during wedlock is legitimate.").
51 Id. § 45a-771(b).
60 Id. § 45a-774 ("Any child or children born as a result of A.I.D. shall be deemed
to acquire, in all respects, the status of a naturally conceived legitimate child of the
husband and wife who consented to and requested the use of A.I.D.").
61 Id. § 45a-772 (a).
12 Id. § 45a-772(b) ("A.I.D. shall not be performed unless the physician receives
in writing the request and consent of the husband and wife desiring the utilization of
A.I.D. for the purpose of conceiving a child or children.").
6 Id. § 45a-773(a).
64 Id. § 45a-777(a); Gordon-Ceresky, supra note 30, at 267-70.
65 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-202(a) (2008) ("Artificial insemination of a woman
shall only be performed under the supervision of a physician licensed under the
Arkansas Medical Practices Act."); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5402 (2002) ("Only
physicians licensed under chapter 18, title 54, Idaho Code, and persons under their
supervision may select artificial insemination donors and perform artificial
insemination."); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.90 (West 2005) ("A non-spousal
artificial insemination shall be performed by a physician or a person who is under the
supervision and control of a physician."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 551 (West 2007)
("The technique of heterologous artificial insemination may be performed in this
state by persons duly authorized to practice medicine at the request and with the
consent in writing of the husband and wife desiring the utilization of such technique
for the purpose of conceiving a child or children."); Id. § 553 ("No person shall
perform the technique of heterologous artificial insemination unless currently
licensed to practice medicine in this state, and then only at the request and with the
written consent of the husband and wife desiring the utilization of such technique.");
OR. REv. STAT. § 677.360 (2007) ("Only physicians licensed under ORS chapter 677
and persons under their supervision may select artificial insemination donors and
perform artificial insemination."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(1) (West 2009) ("If,
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insemination of his wife66 in order for the resulting child to be
considered legitimate . Even in states that do not require the artificial
under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a
wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the
husband of the mother at the time of the conception of the child shall be the natural
father of a child conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing and signed by
him and his wife.").
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-202 (b) ("Prior to conducting the artificial insemination,
the supervising physician shall obtain from the woman and her husband or the donor
of the semen a written statement attesting to the agreement to the artificial
insemination, and the physician shall certify their signatures and the date of the
insemination."); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5403(1) ("Artificial insemination shall not be
performed upon a woman without her prior written request and consent and the
prior written request and consent of her husband."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.92
("The non-spousal artificial insemination of a married woman may occur only if both
she and her husband sign a written consent to the artificial insemination .... "); Id.
§ 3111.93 (setting out content of required writing); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.365(1)
("Artificial insemination shall not be performed upon a woman without her prior
written request and consent and, if she is married, the prior written request and
consent of her husband."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78&-15-704(1) (2008) ("A consent to
assisted reproduction by a married woman must be in a record signed by the woman
and her husband. This requirement does not apply to the donation of eggs for
assisted reproduction by another woman."); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-904(a) (2009)
("Consent by a woman and a man who intends to be the parent of a child born to the
woman by assisted reproduction shall be in a record signed by the woman and the
man.").
67 ALA. CODE § 26-17-702 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045
(2008) ("A child, born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination
performed by a licensed physician and consented to in writing by both spouses, is
considered for all purposes the natural and legitimate child of both spouses."); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (a) ("Any child born to a married woman by means of artificial
insemination shall be deemed the legitimate natural child of the woman and the
woman's husband if the husband consents in writing to the artificial insemination.");
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (West Supp. 2009) ("If, under the supervision of a licensed
physician and surgeon and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in
law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived. The husband's
consent must be in writing and signed by him and his wife."); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-4-
106 (2008) ("If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of
her husband, a wife consents to assisted reproduction with sperm donated by a man
not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a
child thereby conceived."); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405(3) ("The relationship, rights
and obligation between a child born as a result of artificial insemination and the
mother's husband shall be the same for all legal intents and purposes as if the child
had been naturally and legitimately conceived by the mother and the mother's
husband, if the husband consented to the performance of artificial insemination.");
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/2 (West 2009) ("Any child or children born as the
result of heterologous artificial insemination shall be considered at law in all respects
the same as a naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife so
requesting and consenting to the use of such technique."); Id. § 40/3 ("If, under the
supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is
inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband
shall be treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.");
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.824(1) (West 2004) ("If, under the supervision of a licensed
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insemination to be performed by a licensed physician or medical
personnel, the child is classified as legitimate if the inseminated woman's
husband consented to the procedure." Using slightly different
physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with
semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were
the natural father of a child thereby conceived."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(1)
(2009) ("If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of the
woman's husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a person
who is not the husband, the husband is treated in law as if the husband were the
natural father of a child conceived by artificial insemination."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-
44(b) (West 2002) ("If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the
consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a
man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of
a child thereby conceived. The husband's consent shall be in writing and signed by
him and his wife."); N.M. STAT. § 40-11-6A (2006) ("If, under the supervision of a
licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a woman is inseminated
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated as if
he were the natural father of the child thereby conceived so long as the husband's
consent is in writing, signed by him and his wife."); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 73(1)
(McKinney Supp. 2009) ("Any child born to a married woman by means of artificial
insemination performed by persons duly authorized to practice medicine and with
the consent in writing of the woman and her husband, shall be deemed the
legitimate, birth child of the husband and his wife for all purposes."); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3111.95(A) (West 2005) ("If a married woman is the subject of a non-
spousal artificial insemination and if her husband consented to the artificial
insemination, the husband shall be treated in law and regarded as the natural father
of a child conceived as a result of the artificial insemination, and a child so conceived
shall be treated in law and regarded as the natural child of the husband."); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, §§ 552, 554; OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306
(2006); TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 160.703 (Vernon 2008).
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-128 (2007) ("The technique of heterologous
artificial insemination may be performed in this state at the request and with the
consent in writing of the husband and wife desiring the utilization of such technique
for the purpose of conceiving a child or children."); Id. § 23-129 ("Any child or
children heretofore or hereafter born as the result of heterologous artificial
insemination shall be considered at law in all respects the same as a naturally
conceived child of the husband and wife so requesting and consenting to the use of
such technique."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 2009) ("Any child born
to a married woman as a result of artificial insemination with the consent of her
husband, shall be considered the legitimate child of the mother and such husband.");
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.2824(6) (LexisNexis 2005) ("A child conceived by a
married woman with consent of her husband following the utilization of assisted
reproductive technology is considered to be the legitimate child of the husband and
wife."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (2007) ("Any child or children born as the result of
heterologous artificial insemination shall be considered at law in all respects the same
as a naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife requesting and
consenting in writing to the use of such technique."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 ("A
child born to a married woman as a result of artificial insemination, with consent of
the married woman's husband, is deemed to be the legitimate child of the husband
and wife."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-703 ("If a husband provides sperm for, or
consents to, assisted reproduction by his wife ... he is the father of a resulting child
born to his wife."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-903 ("A man who provides sperm for, or
consents to, assisted reproduction by a woman ... with the intent to be the parent of
her child, is the parent of the resulting child.").
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terminology, the Minnesota statute declares the husband of the
inseminated woman to be the biological father of children artificially
conceived by his wife with his written consent.69 The classification as
biological children gives the artificially conceived children the right to
inherit from their mother's husband. Some statutes require more than
just consent. For example, in order to satisfy the statutory conditions of at
least seven states, the husband and wife must request the artificial
insemination and consent to the procedure. 0
When construing the statutory consent requirement, New Mexico
courts have given the statute a liberal reading. Lane v. Lane is illustrative
of that approach. 1 The case involved the following facts: In December of
1984, the husband and wife got married. Prior to the marriage, the
husband had undergone a vasectomy. The wife's plan for more children
was thwarted when the husband refused to have his vasectomy reversed.
In an effort to save the marriage, the husband and wife agreed to have
the wife artificially inseminated with anonymous donor sperm. 7' The
husband never signed a form consenting to the artificial insemination of
his wife. Nevertheless, the husband was an active participant in the
process. He drove his wife to her medical appointments and participated
in birthing classes. The husband was also in the delivery room when the
baby was born.7 After the birth of the child, the husband and wife agreed
to keep the circumstances of the child's birth a secret. Thus, they
informed their family and friends that the husband was the child's
natural father. Additionally, the couple had the husband listed on the
birth certificate as the child's father.
In May 1991, the husband filed for divorce. In his petition, the
husband claimed that the child was a child of the marriage. In her
answer, although she requested sole legal and physical custody of the
child, the wife agreed that the child was a child of the marriage. "' Later in
the process, the wife amended her answer and asserted that her
estranged husband was not the natural or legal father of the child
because the child had been conceived by artificial insemination .
The district court awarded the husband and wife joint custody of the
child. The wife appealed the decision.77 Her principle argument was that,
because the husband had not consented in writing to the artificial
insemination, he was not the legal father of the resulting child.
6' MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 2003).70 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-772(b) (West 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-
5403(1); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/2; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-128; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 49A-1; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 552; OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 677.365(1).
71 912 P.2d 290 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
71 Id. at 292.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
71 Id. at 293.
77 Id. at 292.
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Therefore, as a non-parent, he was not entitled to receive joint custody of
the child. 8 The issue on appeal was whether, under the state's artificial
insemination statute, the existence of a written document was necessary
for the husband to be treated as the artificially conceived child's natural
father.79
The court acknowledged that the plain language of the statute
required the husband to give written consent to the artificial
insemination in order to be recognized as the legal father of the child.s°
However, the court reasoned that strict compliance with the language of
the statute was not necessary as long as the mandates of the statute were
followed sufficiently to carry out the legislative intent and to achieve the
purposes of the statute. ' Thus, the court determined that the
extraordinary facts of the case justified the application of the substantial
compliance doctrine.82
In order to evaluate the facts using the substantial compliance
doctrine, the court articulated two relevant purposes for requiring that
the husband's consent to the artificial insemination of his wife be in
writing. According to the court, the first purpose of the writing
requirement was evidentiary. The court reasoned that, by requiring
written consent, the statute would reduce disagreements over whether or
not the husband had in fact consented to the artificial insemination of
his wife. If there were any doubts, the writing could be presented to end
the debate. The second purpose identified by the court was cautionary.
Consenting to the artificial insemination would expose the husband to
numerous parental obligations with regard to the resulting child.
Therefore, the legislature wanted to make sure that the husband took
time to think before agreeing to be a parent to the artificially conceived
child. The writing requirement gave the husband more time to
contemplate the consequences of putting his signature on the
agreement.
4
The court concluded that in order to comply with the spirit of the
statute, there had to be some type of writing.s However, the statute did
not specify the timing of the consent or the content of the writing.
Consequently, the court opined that the purposes of the statute could be
fulfilled if the writing indicated "(1) the husband knows of the
conception by artificial insemination, (2) the husband agrees that the
7" Id. at 294.
Id. at 292.
Io ld. at 294.
j Id. at 295.
812 The court stated, "Under [the substantial compliance] doctrine, 'a court
should determine whether the statute has been followed sufficiently so as to carry out
the intent for which the statute was adopted and accomplishes the reasonable
objectives of the statute.'" Id. (quoting Vaughn v. United Nuclear Corp., 650 P.2d 3, 7
(N.M. Ct. App.)).
83 Id. at 295.
84 Id.
83 Id.
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husband will be treated as the lawful father of the child so conceived, and
(3) the wife agrees that the husband will be treated as the lawful father of
the child."86 The court also decided that the consent could be given
before the procedure, after the procedure, or after the birth of the
child.87
Relying upon the aforementioned factors, the court held that the
husband had substantially complied with the statute. 8 The court
reasoned that the pleadings filed in the divorce action satisfied the
writing requirement. In his signed petition, the husband claimed
responsibility for the child, and in her signed answer, the wife agreed.
The husband's willingness to be a parent to the artificially conceived
child indicated that he consented to the procedure. 9 As a result of the
court's application of the substantial compliance doctrine, it carried out
the parties' original intent with regards to paternity. In addition, the
court's action was in the child's best interests because it preserved the
father-child relationship that had been established. In this case, a broad
reading of the written consent requirement benefitted the child. Other
states have achieved similar results by removing the requirement that the
man's consent be in writing.
2. Other Forms of Consent
In order for the child to be recognized as legitimate, most states
require that the husband's consent to the artificial insemination of his
wife be in writing; however, a few states have taken a different approach.
For instance, the Maryland statute contains a presumption that the
husband consented to the insemination of his wife.9 Since the husband is
presumed to have consented to the procedure, the resulting child is his
legitimate child. In the state of Utah, the lack of the husband's written
consent does not eliminate the possibility that he will be considered the
legal father of a child born to his inseminated wife. If, after the birth of
the child, the husband acts like a father by openly treating the child as
his own, he will be determined to be the legal father.8 ' As a result, the
artificially conceived child will be able to inherit from his or her mother's
husband. Several state statutes mandate that a husband consent to the
artificial insemination of his wife to be considered the legal parent of the
resulting child without specifically stating that the consent has to be in
writing. Courts have to decide what steps the husband must take to
comply with those statutes. That approach gives the courts a great deal of
86 Id.
87 Id.
a' Id. at 296.
89 Id.
"' MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (LexisNexis 2001); See also K-S. v.
G.S., 440 A.2d 64, 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981).
9 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-704(2) (2008).
92 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANTN. ch. 46, § 4B (West
2009); MICH. COMP. LAWs SERV. § 333.2824(6) (LexisNexis 2005); and TENN. CODE
ANN. § 68-3-306 (2006).
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flexibility. On the other hand, some statutory schemes give the courts no
discretion because the husband's paternity is established by presumption.
B. The Husband is Presumed to Be the Father
Some states take a slightly different approach in determining the
legitimacy of artificially conceived children. Instead of declaring the
children legitimate, the states make it impossible or very difficult for the
husbands of artificially inseminated women to challenge the paternity of
the resulting children. Consequently, the child is deemed legitimate by
default. This is the approach that was taken by the Uniform Status of
Children of Assisted Conception Act.9 The presumption of paternity may
be rebuttable or irrebuttable.
1. Irrebuttable Presumption of Paternity
Florida is an example of a state that does not permit the husband of
an artificially inseminated woman to challenge his paternity after he
consents to the procedure. According to the Florida statute dealing with
the issue, if a woman is artificially inseminated during the course of her
marriage with the written consent of her husband, the husband is
irrebuttably presumed to be the father of any child that results from the
procedure. Georgia has a statute with similar language 9 Since the child
is presumed to be a child of the marriage and the husband is prevented
from challenging that presumption, the child is legitimate. As a result,
the child has the right to inherit from the estate of his or her mother's
husband ."
2. Rebuttable Presumption of Paternity
Other states that have handled the issue in this manner have not
totally precluded the woman's husband from disputing the paternity of
the artificially conceived child. For instance, Delaware permits, but limits,
attempts by husbands of artificially inseminated women to disprove
9 UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 3, 9C U.L.A. 370
(2001); See also id. § 3 cmt., 9C U.L.A. 370-71 ("The presumptive paternity of the
husband of a married woman who bears a child through assisted conception reflects a
concern for the best interests of the children of assisted conception. Any uncertainty
concerning the identity of the father of such a child ought to be shouldered by the
married woman's husband rather than the child. Thus, the husband (not someone
acting on his behalf such as a guardian, administrator or executor) has the obligation
to file an action aimed at denying paternity through lack of consent to the assisted
conception rather than the child or mother having an obligation to prove the
husband's paternity.").
9' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (1) (West 2005). See also KS., 440 A.2d at 68.
95 GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2004).
96 GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-5 (1997) ("An individual conceived by artificial
insemination and presumed legitimate in accordance with Code Section 19-7-21 shall
be considered a child of the parents and entitled to inherit under the laws of
intestacy from the parents and from relatives of the parents, and the parents and
relatives of the parents shall likewise be entitled to inherit as heirs from and through
such individual.").
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paternity. Under the Delaware statute, the husband can only challenge
his paternity of the child if he brings the action within two years of
learning of the birth of the child and the court determines that he did
• 97
not consent to the procedure prior to or after the child's birth. Texas
has a similar statute, but the husband has four years to bring the action."
However, the time restraints on the husband filing a paternity action are
removed if the court finds that the following conditions are met: (1) the
husband's sperm was not used in the process or he did not consent to his
wife being inseminated, (2) the husband and the inseminated woman
did not live together between the probable time of the insemination and
the filing of the action, and (3) the husband failed to openly hold the
child out as his child.99 The UPA's approach is a hybrid of the Texas and
Delaware statutes.1l °
In the state of Louisiana, if the husband of a woman who conceives
by artificial insemination consents to the procedure, he is presumed to
be the legal father of the resulting child. Hence, he is prohibited from
disclaiming the child.'O' Nonetheless, if the husband did not consent to
the insemination he is permitted to file an action for disavowal of
paternity. The action must be filed within one year after the husband
discovered or should have discovered that his wife gave birth to a child by
artificial means.' ° However, if the husband and wife did not live together
during the three hundred days prior to the child's birth, the statute of
limitations for the filing of the disavowal action does not begin to run
" DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-705 (a) (Supp. 2008). Accord UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-
15-705(1) (2008); Wo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-905(a) (2009).
98 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.705(a) (Vernon 2008) ("Except as otherwise
provided by Subsection (b), the husband of a wife who gives birth to a child by means
of assisted reproduction may not challenge his paternity of the child unless: (1)
before the fourth anniversary of the date of learning of the birth of the child he
commences a proceeding to adjudicate his paternity; and (2) the court finds that he
did not consent to the assisted reproduction before or after the birth of the child.").
9' Id. Accord DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-705(b) (Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78B-15-705(2) (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-905(b) (2009).
100 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002) § 705, 9B U.L.A. 64 (Supp. 2009)
("Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), the husband of a wife who gives
birth to a child by means of assisted reproduction may not challenge his paternity of
the child unless: (1) within two years after learning of the birth of the child he
commences a proceeding to adjudicate his paternity; and (2) the court finds that he
did not consent to the assisted reproduction, before or after birth of the child. (b) A
proceeding to adjudicate paternity may be maintained at any time if the court
determines that: (1) the husband did not provide sperm for, or before or after the
birth of the child consent to, assisted reproduction by his wife; (2) the husband and
the mother of the child have not cohabited since the probable time of assisted
reproduction; and (3) the husband never openly held out the child as his own. (c)
The limitation provided in this section applies to a marriage declared invalid after
assisted reproduction.").
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 188 (2007).
' Id. at art. 189.
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until the husband receives written notification that an interested party
has claimed that he is the artificially conceived child's father.
10 3
In New Hampshire, a man is legally recognized as the presumptive
father of a child that is born under any of the following circumstances:
(1) during his marriage, (2) within 300 days after the dissolution of his
marriage, or (3) within 300 days after he and his wife have been deemed
legally separated by a court. 1 4 Based upon the presumption, the man's
name is listed on the child's birth record.'0 This presumption can only
be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.0 6 Nothing in this provision
indicates that artificially inseminated children are not covered by this
presumption. In fact, the statute provides that the presumption cannot
be rebutted by showing that the child was conceived by artificial means as
long as the husband agreed to the artificial insemination of his wife.)° If
the man is unable to successfully rebut the presumption of paternity, the
law recognizes the existence of a father-child relationship. Once a father-
child relationship is created, the child is considered to be legitimate. As
a legitimate child, the artificially conceived child is entitled to inherit
from his or her mother's husband who dies intestate. 0 9
It is difficult for a man to rebut the presumption of a father-child
relationship between himself and a child his wife gives birth to as a result
of artificial insemination. Moreover, as a result of that presumption, the
man owes numerous legal duties to the artificially conceived child.
Consequently, New Hampshire's legislature established a statutory
scheme with several safeguards to ensure that the rights of the husband
of an artificially inseminated woman are protected. The legislature
sought to make sure that the husband gave informed consent for his wife
to be artificially inseminated."0 First, prior to the performance of the
procedure, the woman and her husband must both receive counseling."'
Furthermore, unlike in most jurisdictions, the husband has to do more
than just give written consent to have his wife artificially inseminated. In
order to be responsible for the resulting child, the husband has to agree
in writing to accept the "legal rights and responsibilities of
parenthood."' 2 By his agreement, the husband is stating a willingness to
be legally responsible for any children that result from the artificial
103 Id.
'0o N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:3(I) (a) (LexisNexis 2001).
'0,5 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5-C:30(I) (LexisNexis 2008).
1o6 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:3(I1) (LexisNexis 2001).
107 Id.
... Id. § 168-B:7.
'0 Id. § 168-B:9(I) (a).
... "'Informed consent' occurs when a competent person, while exercising care
for his or her own welfare, makes a voluntary decision about whether or not to
participate in a proposed medical procedure or contractual arrangement that is
based on a full awareness of the relevant facts." Id. § 168-B:1 (VI).
Id. § 168-B:13(IV).
Id. § 168-B:13(IV)(c).
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insemination of his wife with the sperm of another man.' 3 Even if the
procedure is conducted without the required counseling or agreement
by the husband, he may still be conclusively presumed to have consented
to the procedure if he does not object in a timely manner. Specifically,
the husband must bring an action to dispute paternity within 30 days
after he learns or should have learned of the child's birth."4 The lack of
an artificial insemination statute does not prevent a woman's husband
from being financially responsible for the child.
C. Common Law Principle
In states that have not enacted statutes specifically addressing the
legal issues arising from the existence of artificially conceived children,
the courts must rely upon family law principles to determine the paternal
obligations of the husband of the inseminated woman. Even in states that
have statutes, the common law principles are relevant in situations where
the statutes are not applicable.'
The underlying principle influencing the courts' decisions is the best
interest of the artificially conceived child.' ' Since it is usually in the best
interest of the child to have financial support from at least two parents,
the courts have found ways to make the husband of the child's biological
mother legally responsible for the child's financial support. The primary
methods available to the courts are (1) the estoppel doctrine, (2) the
paternity presumption, and (3) the best interest paternity presumption.
1. Estoppel
Courts have relied on the estoppel doctrine to hold the husband of
an artificially inseminated woman responsible for the resulting child in
cases where the man claims that he should not have to support a child
who is not biologically connected to him."' The court took that approach
in Levin v. Levin."" Since Donald Levin was sterile, he agreed to permit
his wife, Barbara, to be artificially inseminated with sperm from an
anonymous donor. After the resulting child was born, Barbara and
Donald were named as the parents on the birth certificate. In 1987, when
the child was ten years old, the couple divorced.' 9
In the divorce decree, Donald was ordered to pay child support
because the child was determined to be a child of the marriage. Donald
filed a motion in 1992 to be relieved from his child support obligation. In
"l Id. § 168-B:13(IV).
Id. § 168-B:3(II).
", Bridget R. Penick, Note, Give the Child a Legal Father: A Plea for Iowa to Adopt a
Statute Regulating Artificial Insemination by Anonymous Donor, 83 IoWA L. REv. 633, 658-
61 (1998).
116 In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 1040 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
2005). See also C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 825 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977).
17 See In reMarriage of L.M.S., 312 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
II Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 605 (Ind. 1994).
1 Id. at 603.
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response, Barbara filed a motion to have Donald's child support• 120
obligation increased. Donald argued that he should not have to
financially support the child because he did not have a 2ersonal
relationship with the child and he was not the biological father.
The Indiana Court of Appeals held that Donald was estopped from
refusing to pay child support. That holding was affirmed by the Indiana
Supreme Court.12 The Supreme Court reasoned that the estoppel
doctrine was applicable because it is an appropriate remedy when "one
party through his course of conduct knowingly misleads or induces
another party to believe and act upon his conduct in good faith without
knowledge of the facts.. Applying that reasoning to the facts, the court
found that Donald encouraged Barbara to be inseminated and to have
the child.
The court focused upon Donald's action prior to and after the
child's birth to conclude that it was reasonable for Barbara to expect him
to financially support the child. Prior to the child's conception, Donald
agreed, both orally and in writing, to Barbara being artificially
inseminated.14 After the child was born, Donald functioned as the child's
father for fifteen years. In addition, Donald never objected to the child
being named as a child of the marriage in the divorce decree. Based
upon those facts, the court concluded that Barbara acted in good faith
when she bore the child in reliance on Donald's promise to be
responsible for the child. Therefore, Donald was estopped from seeking
to be relieved of his parental obligations to the child.26 The courts'
willingness to apply the estoppel doctrine to prevent a woman's husband
from being relieved of parental obligations and from being denied
parental rights may stem from the existence of the marital presumption.
2. Marital Presumption of Paternity (Traditional and Best Interests)
In cases where an artificial insemination statute is not involved,
artificial insemination is treated as just another way for a woman to get
pregnant. The focus is upon the timing of the child's conception or
birth, and not upon the method used to create the child. Therefore, if a
woman conceives or gives birth to a child while she is married, her• 1 2 7
husband is presumed to be the father of the child. This long-standing. .. 
. . . 128
common law principle has been codified in most jurisdictions. The
purposes of the presumption include protecting the marriage and the
120 Id.
121 Id. at 603-04.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 604.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 604-05.
126 Id. at 605.
127 See Thompson v. Hoover, No. 2004 CV 4632 CU, 2005 WL 4676373, at *18
(Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Dec. 22, 2005); E.W. v. T.S., 916 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2007).
'2 See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 584-4(a) (1) (LexisNexis 2006).
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welfare of the child.129 The presumption may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence that the man was not in a position to contribute to
the child's conception.13 0 However, the courts have been reluctant to
permit a man to rebut the presumption if the marriage is still intact.
13
1
Therefore, in some states, the biological father is not permitted to rebut
the presumption that the woman's husband is the father of a child born
during the marriage.
1
3
2
Some jurisdictions have applied the best interests of the child
standard when determining whether the marital presumption should
dictate an adjudication of paternity.' Hence, a person will only be
permitted to rebut the presumption of paternity if it would be in the best
134interests of the child to do so. The person seeking to rebut the
presumption of paternity must prove that the woman's husband could
not be the child's biological father. Historically, the presumption was
rebutted by evidence indicating that the husband was impotent, sterile,
or not in a position to have sex with the woman during the time the child
was conceived. 3 5 Currently, the primary way to rebut the presumption of
the husband's paternity is to have blood tests conducted.13 Nonetheless,
if the court concludes that rebutting the presumption is not in the child's
best interests, the statutes in some jurisdictions give the court the
authority to refuse to order blood tests.' 37 Although non-marital children
3' Jacqulyn A. West, Comment, Maintaining the Legal Fiction: Application of the
Presumption of Paternity and Paternity by Estoppel in Pennsylvania, 42 DUQ. L. REv. 577,
579-80 (2004); Megan Pendleton, Note, Intestate Inheritance Claims: Determining a
Child's Right to Inherit When Biological and Presumptive Paternity Overlap, 29 CARDOZO L.
REv.' 2823, 2824-25 (2008).
"0 Green v. Good, 704 A.2d 682, 684 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
131 See, e.g., Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 180-81 (Pa. 1997).
132 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-607(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) ("Except as
otherwise provided in subsection (b), a presumed father may bring an action to
disprove paternity at any time. If the presumed father persists in his status as the legal
father of a child, neither the mother nor any other individual may maintain an action
to disprove paternity."). Contra Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.80(d) (West 2009) (allowing the
man claiming to be the child's biological father to bring an action to rebut the
presumption of paternity).
,33 See, e.g., In re Paternity of Adam, 903 P.2d 207, 210-11 (Mont. 1995).
,34 See, e.g., Ban v. Quigley, 812 P.2d 1014, 1018 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) ("Prior to
ordering a blood test to determine whether the presumed parent is the biological
parent, the district court must consider the best interests of the child, including
physical, mental, and emotional needs. The shifting of paternity from the presumed
father to the biological father could easily be detrimental to the emotional and
physical well-being of any child. Although someone may suffer, it should never be the
child, who is totally innocent and who has no control over or conception of the
environment into which he or she has been placed.").
Kohler v. Bleem, 654 A.2d 569, 572 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
See In re S.C.V., 750 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex. 1988) (blood tests admissible to
establish non-paternity); Walker v. Covington, 731 N.Y.S.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001).
137 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.855 (West 2009) ("[A]t any time in an action to
establish the paternity of a child.., the court... may, with respect to a male, refuse
to order genetic tests, if genetic tests have not yet been taken, and dismiss the action
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are currently permitted to inherit from their fathers, those children still
bear more of a burden than marital children.' Consequently, it makes
sense for courts to be hesitant to relieve a woman's husband of his
parental status. The treatment of the husband may depend upon the
status of the sperm donor involved in the process. The parental rights of
sperm donors are addressed in the next Part.
IV. PATERNAL OBLIGATIONS OF NON-SPOUSAL SPERM DONORS
In the 1993 movie Made in America, Whoopi Goldberg played Sarah
Matthews, a professional woman who conceived her daughter, Zora,
through the use of artificial insemination. 139 After Zora discovered that
Sarah's deceased husband was not her birth father, she decided to find
the man who donated the sperm that resulted in her conception. Zora's
quest to locate her father and to develop a relationship with him made
for an entertaining movie. The sperm donor, Hal Jackson, played by Ted
Danson, welcomed Zora with opened arms. 0 Hal was a successful used
car salesman who made television commercials. The movie raised
interesting legal questions about Hal's financial obligations to Zora. Hal
was a single man with a good source of income and appeared to have no
close relatives."" In the event that Hal died intestate, was Zora legally
entitled to his entire estate? Since Hal was a non-spousal sperm donor,
under the statutory schemes in most jurisdictions, the answer to the
question would be no.
Some couples who have the potential to be good parents are unable
to conceive. The creation of new reproductive technology has given those
couples hope. 41 In particular, sperm donation has given countless
couples, especially same-sex couples, the opportunity to procreate.
143
Many young men view sperm donation as a benign act similar to giving
blood. Most do not think about the fact that their sperm could be used to
successfully conceive a child or several children. They certainly do not
if the court ... determines that a judicial determination of whether the male is the
father of the child is not in the best interests of the child.").
... Paula A. Monopoli, Nonmarital Children and Post-Death Parentage: A Different Path
for Inheritance Law?, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 857, 859 (2008).
"' MADE INAMERICA (Warner Bros. 1993).
140 Id.
141 Under the basic intestacy system in the majority of U.S. jurisdictions, an
unmarried man's children inherit his estate. This is the case even if the child is born
out of wedlock. See Jennifer R. Boone Hargis, Solving Injustice in Inheritance Laws
Through Judicial Discretion: Common Sense Solutions from Common Law Tradition, 2 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 447, 449-50 (2003); see also Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life
and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproductive Technologies, 25 HoFSTRA L. REV. 1091,
1098-99 (1997).
142 Anna L. Benjamin, Note, The Implications of Using the Medical Expense Deduction
of I.R. C. § 213 to Subsidize Assisted Reproductive Technology, 79 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1117,
1119 (2004).
"' John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 323, 349 (2004).
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consider the possibility that they could be obligated to help financially
support the children. Should that be a possibility? Should a sperm
donor be involuntarily converted into a father?
States have taken a few different approaches with regards to the legal
obligations that a non-spousal sperm donor has to a child who is
conceived as the result of artificial insemination. The approach taken by
the UPA145 and most states is to declare that the sperm donor is not a
parent to the child. 46 If the donor is not a parent, he is not obligated to
support the child. Therefore, the child is not the man's legal heir under
the intestacy system. Some states have handled the issue by ignoring the
fact that the sperm donor is the paternal parent of the artificially
conceived child. In those jurisdictions, the man who donated the sperm
is not treated as the resulting child's natural father, so he has no legal
obligation to provide financial support for the child.147 Other states have
sought to resolve the issue by identifying the rights of the child in
relation to the sperm donor. Under the laws of those states, an artificially
conceived child has no right to support from the man who donated the
sperm that resulted in his or her conception. 4 1 In a few states, the non-
spousal sperm donor may have some legal rights with regards to the
.... 149
artificially conceived child. Finally, some states do not have a statute
specifically addressing the parental status of a sperm donor.
1 50
A. Sperm Donor May Not Be Acknowledged as the Father
In order for a child to inherit from the estate of a man, that man
must be classified as the child's parent. In most jurisdictions, sperm
donors are not given parental status. 5 1 Consequently, the child who is
conceived as the result of artificial insemination is not eligible to inherit
' The UPA and the majority of state artificial insemination statutes specifically
exclude a sperm donor from parental obligations in certain circumstances. See Lori B.
Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 623, 660 (1991);
see also Hollandsworth, supra note 37, at 207-10.
"' UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
46 E.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-902 (2009).
117 E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (2009).
"' E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239(2) (2007) ("A child born as a result of the
artificial insemination shall have no right, obligation or interest with respect to such
donor.").
"9 E.g., N.M. STAT. § 40-11-6(B) (2006).
"0 For example, the Michigan Legislature has dealt with the legal consequences
of the existence of artificially conceived children by passing a statute stating in
relevant part: "A child conceived by a married woman with consent of her husband
following the utilization of assisted reproductive technology is considered to be the
legitimate child of the husband and wife." MICH. COMP. LAws SERV. § 333.2824(6)
(LexisNexis 2005). The statutory provision leads one to conclude that a sperm donor
has no obligation to a child conceived using his sperm if the woman is married.
Nonetheless, the legislature has not yet addressed the situation where an unmarried
woman conceives a child using donated sperm.
' E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106(2) (2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702
(Vernon 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-702 (2008).
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from the estate of the man who gave him or her half of his chromosomes.
Although the sperm donor may be a biological parent of the child he
helped conceive, several state legislatures have enacted statutes stripping
him of that status. By not acknowledging the sperm donor's position as
the male parent of the child, the statutes relieve him of any parental
duties to the child. 1 2 Florida takes a unique approach when dealing with
the parental status of the sperm donor. The statute recognizes that the
sperm donor has some parental rights. However, the statute requires the
donor to surrender all rights to the child produced as a result of his
donation.
53
In order to encourage sperm donations, states must take steps to
ensure that a man is not legally responsible for a child conceived using
154his sperm. This is important because the majority of sperm donors are
young men who are not ready to have families. They are usually donating
sperm to make extra money. Sperm donors probably treat donating
sperm for money just like they treat donating blood for money.
Consequently, state legislatures have made it clear that donating sperm
does not make the man an instant father. The state of Wisconsin enacted
the following statutory language: "The donor of semen provided to a
licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other
than the donor's wife is not the natural father of a child conceived, bears
no liability for the support of the child and has no parental rights with
regard to the child.'
The above language indicates that a non-spouse who donates sperm
to inseminate a woman does not have a duty to take care of the artificially
conceived child. 1 7 This lack of responsibility is present in situations
involving the insemination of married and unmarried women. Since the
non-spousal sperm donor has no legal obligation to support the
artificially conceived child, the child is not entitled to inherit from his
estate. A sperm donor is not just relieved of financial responsibility for
the artificially conceived child; state statutory schemes also eliminate any
relationship between the donor and the child.'S'
'52 The donor is not the child's natural father. ALA. CODE § 26-17-702 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2008); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West Supp. 2009), cited in Steven S. v.
Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
40/3(b) (West 2009); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.824(2) (West 2004). The donor is not the
child's biological father. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56(2) (West 2003).
153 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 2005); see also Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d
316, 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
'5 June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and Trust:
Building Ethical Understandings into the Market far Fertility Services, 9 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 509, 535-36 (2006).
155 Anne Reichman Schiff, Frustrated Intentions and Binding Biology: Seeking AID in
the Law, 44 DUKE L.J. 524, 562 (1994).
'- Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(2) (West 2009).
157 Id.
15s OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 555 (West 2007) ("An oocyte donor shall have no
right, obligations or interest with respect to a child born as a result of a heterologous
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The nonparental status of a sperm donor is important for two
reasons. First, it encourages sperm donation and protects a sperm donor
from being financially responsible for a large number of children. This
protection is crucial because a popular sperm donor could potentially
father dozens of children.- 9 Second, by not recognizing the sperm donor
as a parent, the law permits couples to use donor sperm without worrying
about having to deal with a man who comes forward and claims to be the
biological father of the child. 16 Nonetheless, the laws in some
jurisdictions give the non-spousal sperm donor the opportunity to parent
the artificially conceived child.
B. Sperm Donor May Be Acknowledged as the Father
1. Sperm Donor Agrees in Writing
Under the laws of some states, it is possible for the sperm donor to
become financially responsible for the artificially conceived child. For
example, in New Hampshire, a sperm donor can agree in writing to be
liable for the support of the child. 6 If the procedure is performed by a
licensed physician, the Kansas and the New Mexico statutes release a
non-spousal sperm donor from all parental duties with regards to the
artificially conceived child. Nonetheless, the sperm donor and the
inseminated woman can make a written agreement obligating the non-
spousal sperm donor to act as the birth or natural father of any children
162that are conceived as a result of the procedure. New Jersey has a statute
containing language similar to that used in the Kansas and New Mexico
statutes• 6
2. Sperm Donor Agrees by Statutory Noncompliance
As indicated above, in order to receive the protection of the artificial
insemination statute in several states, the sperm donor must deposit his
oocyte donation from such donor. A child born as a result of a heterologous oocyte
donation shall have no right, obligation or interest with respect to the person who
donated the oocyte which resulted in the birth of the child.").
"' Betsy Streisand, Who's Your Daddy?: Sperm Donors Rely on Anonymity. Now Donor
Offspring (and Their Moms) are Breaking Down the Walls of Privacy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Feb. 5, 2006, available at http://health.usnews.com/usnews/health/articles/
060213/l3donor.htm ("'I could fill a banquet hall with my children,' says one donor
from Southern California, who, like many medical students in the '60s and '70s,
donated sperm to help cover living expenses.").
"o Kristin E. Koehler, Comment, Artificial Insemination: In the Child's Best Interest?,
5 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 321, 332 (1996).
16' N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:11 (LexisNexis 2001).
,62 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(f) (2000); N.M. STAT. § 40-11-6 (2006).
'6 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 2002) ("Unless the donor of semen and the
woman have entered into a written contract to the contrary, the donor of semen
provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other
than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the father of a child thereby
conceived and shall have no rights or duties stemming from the conception of a
child.").
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sperm with a licensed physician. YConsequently, if the woman conceives
as a result of self-insemination, the sperm donor may be recognized as
the child's legal father.1 65 Because the process of artificial insemination is
not a procedure that requires any type of medical expertise, it is not
difficult to imagine a situation where a woman is inseminated at homel 166
using a turkey baster. In that circumstance, the woman will usually
know the donor so a licensed physician will not be involved in the
procedure. In almost half of the states with such statutes, since the sperm
donor is the biological father and he did not comply with the statute, he
may be held to be legally responsible for paying child support. 67
3. States Without Statutes
A number of states have not enacted statutes that deal with the
parental status of sperm donors. In those states, the courts have dealt
with the issue on a case-by-case basis, relying on common law principles
and statutes that were created when a family still consisted of one man,
one woman, and their children. It is like trying to put a square peg into a
round hole. It just does not fit. The outcomes have often been
inconsistent with societal values and sound public policy.
For example, the state of Pennsylvania has not adopted the UPA and
it does not have an independent statute that identifies the legal rights
and obligations of a sperm donor. In a recent case, the court was called
upon to determine whether a sperm donor was obligated to pay child
support. 69 The case resulted from an attempt by two women to create a
family. Jennifer L. Schultz and Jodilynn Jacob solidified their relationship
by participating in a commitment ceremony and establishing a civil
union. Then the women decided to start a family together. To that end,
Jennifer asked her friend Carl Frampton to donate sperm to be used in
the artificial insemination of Jodilynn. Jodilynn conceived two children
using Carl's sperm. After the women separated, the court awarded
physical custody of the two children to Jodilynn. At that time, Jennifer
" See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1042 (Kan. 2007). The court in In re K.M.H.
held that the failure of the sperm donor to deposit his sperm with a licensed
physician did not take the transaction outside of the artificial insemination statute as
long as a licensed physician actually performed the procedure. Id. In the case, the
man delivered his sperm directly to the woman and she took it to a licensed physician
who performed the artificial insemination. Id.
See, e.gJhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
6 John C. Sheldon, Surrogate Mothers, Gestational Carriers, and a Pragmatic
Adaptation of the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000, 53 ME. L. REv. 523, 532-33 (2001).
'6' Allison J. Stone, Comment, "Sisters Are Doin' It for Themselves!" Why the Parental
Rights of Registered Domestic Partners Must Trump the Parental Rights of Their Known Sperm
Donors in California, 41 U.S.F. L. REv. 505, 510 (2007).
' The Associated Press, Pa. Sperm Donor to Lesbian Couple Ordered to Pay Child
Support, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REv., May 10, 2007, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.
com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/cityregion/s_506968.html.
'6 Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); see alsoJason Miller,
Sperm Donor Indispensable Party to Support Proceeding, LAW. J. (Allegheny County Bar
Ass'n, Pittsburgh, Pa.) June 22, 2007, at 2.
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received partial physical custody and Carl was awarded partial physical
custody of the children for one weekend each month. 7 °
Jodilynn filed a successful child support action against Jennifer.17' In
response, Jennifer claimed that Carl should also be obligated to pay child
support. Thus, she sought to join him as an indispensable party. After the
trial court denied her joinder motion, Jennifer appealed. 172 The trial
court reasoned that, as a sperm donor, Carl was not legally obligated to
pay child support and therefor was not an indispensable party.
Relying on the principles of equitable estoppel, the court found that
fairness dictated that Carl have a duty to provide financial support for the
children since he was their biological father.14 The court's decision to
obligate Carl to pay child support was influenced by the fact that Carl
acted like a parent. The court considered the following actions to be
legally relevant: (1) Carl voluntarily provided financial support to the
children; (2) Carl was present when at least one of the children was born;
(3) Carl was awarded partial physical custody of the children; and (4)
Carl permitted the children to call him "Papa.' ' 75 The court reasoned
that, since Carl acted as if he were a parent, he should be estopped from
denying his parental obligations, including the duty to pay child
support.
76
The result of this case was unique because the court held three
adults liable for the financial support of the two artificially conceived
children. It was one of the first published cases in which a court required
a sperm donor to financially support a child conceived using his genetic
material. The court noted that, in reaching its decision, it was more
motivated by promoting the best interests of the children than by
protecting the legal rights of the parents. Nevertheless, the court stated,
"We recognize this is a matter which is better addressed by the legislature
rather than the courts." 77 As of the time of the publication of this Article,
the Pennsylvania legislature still had not enacted a statute responding to
the court's concerns. Carl died of a heart attack while the case was
pending.78 Thus, the probate system was implicated.
The outcome of the case indicates the need for legislation to clarify
the obligations of the men involved in the artificial insemination process.
There are several troubling aspects of the case. First, the court's decision
did not carry out the expectations of the parties involved in the
transaction. At the time he agreed to act as a sperm donor, since he was
doing a favor for a friend, Carl had no intention of being a legal parent
"' Jacob, 923 A.2d at 476.
171 Id.
172 Id.
'73 Id. at 480.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 481.
176 Id.
117 Id. at 482.
'78 The Associated Press, supra note 168.
2009]
HeinOnline  -- 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 977 2009
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
to any resulting children. The women were in a long-term committed
relationship and intended to raise any children as a couple. In an effort
to provide financial support for the children, the court ignored the
reproductive freedom of the adults involved in the process. The sperm
donor was repaid for his generous gift by being forced to be a legal
parent to the children. The parental rights of the women were decreased
by the court giving the children a third parent. This is a dangerous
precedent because it has the potential of negatively impacting same-sex
couples who typically turn to male friends or relatives for sperm. 1 9 It can
be argued that the reproductive rights of the adults were sacrificed to
promote the best interests of the children.18 ° These interests should be
balanced; one interest should not supplant the other. However, since the
children are the most innocent parties involved in the scenario, the scale
should tip in their favor.
Second, the court appeared to penalize the man because he had a
relationship with the children and was responsible enough to help out
financially. These are not behaviors that society wants to discourage. It
makes sense that Carl would have a relationship with the children
because he was a friend of the family. He probably considered himself to
be an uncle, not a parent. Nothing in the facts indicates that Carl was
even the children's godfather. The women might have encouraged Carl
to take an active part in the children's lives because there was no other
close male figure in the picture. The court should not have interpreted
Carl's desire to have a relationship with the children as consent to be a
parent.
Finally, the biggest impact of the case may be to discourage the use
of known sperm donors. If an unknown donor had been involved in this
case, the outcome probably would have been different. There are many
good reasons to use known sperm donors.'8' A woman may be more
comfortable using the sperm of a man she knows because she has been
able to observe his behavior and ascertain his character. Further, the use
of a known sperm donor makes it easier for the child to obtain his or her
medical history.18 2 In light of the cost of the artificial insemination
'79 Alexa E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in the Context of
Collaborative Reproduction, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 329, 351 (1995).
,0 In re Marriage of Witbeck-Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122, 126 (Il. App. Ct. 1996)
("Just as a woman has a constitutionally protected right not to bear a child, a man has
the right not to be deemed the parent of a child that he played no part in
conceiving.") (citation omitted).
' Lezin, supra note 29, at 208-09; see also Megan D. McIntyre, Comment, The
Potential for Products Liability Actions when Artificial Insemination by an Anonymous Donor
Produces Children with Genetic Defects, 98 DICK. L. REv. 519, 522-24 (1994) (evaluating
the negative aspects of relying on anonymous sperm donors).
18' See Pino D'Orazio, Note, Half of the Family Tree: A Call for Access to a Full Genetic
History for Children Born by Artificial Insemination, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 249,
253-55 (2006) (discussing the reasons why it is important for an artificially conceived
child to know the full genetic and medical history of the donor who supplied the
sperm).
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process, it is more affordable to use a known sperm donor. The use of a
known donor eliminates the cost of the sperm and makes the use of a
physician optional. Consequently, infertile low- and moderate-income
women will have the opportunity to conceive. The outcome of this case
indicates why state legislatures should enact laws that protect the rights of
all parties, including the children, involved in the artificial insemination
process.
V. MISSING COMPONENTS
The statutory scheme presently in place to address the paternal
obligations of the men involved in the artificial insemination process may
create more problems than it solves.
A. Marital Status of the Woman
A crucial deficiency of the current statutory regime is the failure to
recognize situations involving unmarried women.'" The majority of the
statutes refer exclusively to legally married couples.1 4 Only two states
have followed the UPA's approach and made their statutes applicable to
cases involving unmarried persons.'8 5 Thus, the current statutory regime
ignores the fact that unmarried women are utilizing reproductive
technology. 1 6 The limited scope of the statutes has adversely impacted• • 187
women involved in same-sex relationships. In some cases, the women
have been left without a remedy. In other cases, the courts have been
forced to use creative means to ensure that the women can avail
• 188
themselves of the statutory protection. The following discussion of a
Massachusetts case will illustrate the necessity to amend the state statutes
183 Brad Sears, Recent Development, Winning Arguments/Losing Themselves: The
(Dys)Functional Approach in Thomas S. vs. Robin Y., 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 559,
562-63 (1994); but see In re Adoption of Michael, 636 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.
1996) (holding that an unmarried woman inseminated using the sperm of an
anonymous donor was entitled to the protection of the artificial insemination statute
even though the statute referred to "married" women).
181 Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 307 (1988); see
also In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 306-11 (111. App. Ct. 2005) (refusing
to apply artificial insemination statute to situation involving a transsexual male who
was born female and married a woman who conceived through artificial
insemination).
" The Wyoming statute applies to married and unmarried persons. The consent
must be signed by the woman and the man who plans to parent the child. Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2-904(a) (2009).
'86 Padgett supra note 39 at 518.
817 Michael L. Hopkins, Comment, "What is Sauce for the Gander is Sauce for the
Goose:" Enforcing Child Support on Former Same-Sex Partners Who Create a Child Through
Artificial Insemination, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 219, 222 (2006).
... See In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 1041 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
2005) (applying artificial insemination statute to same-sex couple who got married in
Canada by focusing upon the commitment made by the couple instead of upon their
gender).
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to apply to situations involving unmarried women in same-sex or
heterosexual relationships.
Two women lived together as a couple. 89 After they took part in a
commitment ceremony, the women merged their financial resources.190
In addition, the women named each other as beneficiaries on their life
insurance policies and retirement plans. One woman wanted to have a
child and the other one did not want to parent a child. Nonetheless, the
woman eventually reluctantly agreed to raise a child with her partner. 91
The couple chose to have a child through the use of artificial
insemination. To that end, the couple went to a clinic and picked out a
donor. At the clinic, they both signed a consent form. In addition, the
couple raised the money to pay for the procedure by combining their192
money. Through the use of artificial insemination, the woman
conceived a child in December of 1999. In May 2000, the couple
separated. At that time, the partner of the inseminated woman promised
to provide financial support for the child. 193  194
The couple's son was born on July 1, 2000. After the baby's birth,
the former partner of the child's mother again promised to help
financially support the child. She visited the hospital several times and
helped to name the baby. 195 As a result of being born prematurely, the
baby had several medical problems. Thus, the biological mother
requested that her former partner pay child support. In response, the
former partner notified the child's biological mother that she did not
want to have anything to do with her or the child.
1 96
The biological mother filed a law suit seeking child support
payments from her former partner.1 97 In her law suit, the woman made
two arguments. First, she argued that, since her former partner had
orally promised to financially support the child, she should be estopped
from reneging on her promise. The woman wanted the court to treat the
oral promise like an implied contract to pay child support and to hold
her former partner liable for breach of contract. Secondly, the woman
contended that the court should use its equitable power to order her
former partner to pay child support. 99
The court found that the former partner had entered into an
implied contract to parent the artificially conceived child.2" ° Nonetheless,
1. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1246-47 (Mass. 2004).
0 Id. at 1247.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1247-48.
194 Id. at 1248.
193 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
20 Id. at 1249.
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the court concluded that the enforcement of the contract would be
against public policy. 20' The court also opined that the former partner
had not made an independent promise to pay child support. The court
202implied that if such a promise was made, it may have been enforceable.
With regards to the equity issue, the court acknowledged that the
legislature had given it equitable powers to protect the best interests of
the child. However, the court noted that the equitable powers could only
be used to enforce legal obligations, not to create legal obligations.
Therefore, if the former domestic partner was not legally obligated to pay
203
child support, the court could not compel her to do so. In order for
the domestic partner to have a duty to pay child support, she had to be
recognized as a parent. The woman had no biological connection to the
child. Consequently, the court analyzed whether or not she was the
child's legal parent. As a part of that analysis, the court turned to the
204state's artificial insemination statute °. The court concluded that the
statue did not provide a remedy for the biological mother because it was
solely intended to apply to a situation involving a woman and her
205
spouse. In support of its decision not to hold the former domestic
partner liable for child support, the court stated, "the Legislature has not
addressed the situation.., where a non-marital cohabitant consents to
such a procedure. '0 6
The statue at issue in this case is similar to statutes in the majority of
jurisdictions. Hence, the result in this case indicates why the current
statutory scheme does not effectively protect the best interests of the
artificially created child. It is clear that if the case had involved a married
man and woman, the man would have been obligated to pay child
support. However, since the child was born into a family consisting of an
unmarried couple, the court could not use its equitable powers to
provide a remedy for the child. As a result, artificially conceived children
who are born to same-sex couples or unmarried heterosexual couples are
disadvantaged because of the marital status of their parents. In the past,
the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated statutes that treated non-marital
207children in a similar fashion.
When two adults unite and agree to conceive a child by artificial
insemination they should both be financially responsible for the child.
The marital status of the two adults should not impact the child's ability
to receive child support. Once the child is born, it is in the child's best
interests to receive financial support from at least two persons. One of
the adults should not be excused from paying child support because the
20' Id. at 1250.
202 Id. at 1252.
203 Id.
2o4 Id. at 1252-53.
205 Id. at 1253.
06 Id.
207 Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right to Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uniform Parentage
Act, 16 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 203 (2007).
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child was not born into a traditional family. This is consistent with the
public policy that one parent cannot contract away a child's right to child
support because the right to child support is the right of the child and
not of the parent.
2
0
8
B. Changed Circumstances
Only a few state legislatures have made provisions for changed
circumstances.209 The majority of artificial insemination statutes do not
allow for the possibility that after the man consents to the process the
couple's situation might change. There are several legitimate reasons why
a man may have a change of heart. The artificial insemination process
can be stressful and heartbreaking. It usually takes several attempts
before a woman is successfully inseminated.'0 Even after a successful
insemination, there is still a chance that the pregnancy may end
prematurely. At some stage of the process, the man may decide that he
can no longer endure the pain of the process. Moreover, during the
artificial insemination process, the relationship between the man and the
woman may deteriorate so much that the man decides that it would not
be fair to bring a child into the relationship. Furthermore, the man may
lose his job or suffer some other hardship that impairs his ability to
financially support a child. If the child has not yet been conceived, the
man should have the right to withdraw his consent to the procedure.
In some cases, the man may consent to the artificial insemination of
his wife, and die before the child is conceived. 21  After the man has
consented and before the child is conceived, the couple may divorce.
Courts presented with these situations have to determine the impact the
changed circumstances have on the man's paternity. Unfortunately, the
legislatures in the majority of states have failed to give the courts
guidance on this issue. A majority of statutes regulating the artificial
insemination process do not account for changed circumstances. Thus, a
See Bassett v. Saunders, 835 So. 2d 1198, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) ("The
rights of support and meaningful relationship belong to the child, not the parent;
therefore, neither parent can bargain away those rights .. "); See also Ferguson v.
McKiernan, 855 A.2d 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (refusing to enforce oral agreement
between mother and sperm donor father in which man agreed to donate sperm so
woman could conceive a child using artificial insemination if the woman promised to
release him from all responsibility with regards to the resulting child).
20 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-65 (Supp. 2009) ("If an individual who
consented in a record to be a parent by assisted reproduction dies before placement
of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting
child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction
were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the child.").
2o See BabyCenter, Fertility Treatment: Artificial Insemination (UI), Sept. 2006,
http://www.babycenter.com/0-fertiity-treatment-artificia-insemination-iui-4092.bc
("[M]ost women undergo three to six cycles of artificial insemination before getting
pregnant or trying another treatment.").N.D. CEN'T. CODE § 14-20-65.
112 See, e.g., KS. v. G.S., 440 A.2d 64, 68 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981).
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plain reading of a typical artificial insemination statute indicates that
once the man consents to the artificial insemination of his wife, he is
bound by that consent indefinitely. Thus, the man is legally responsible
for the resulting child. The end result of that statutory deficiency is
litigation that often negatively impacts the artificially created child.
If the man changes his mind or the couple's circumstances change
prior to conception of the child, there should be a mechanism in place
to permit the man to withdraw his consent. Courts have recognized a
man's right to prevent his ex-wife from using his genetic material to
procreate.1 3 The reasoning of those courts indicates that a man should
have the right to change his mind about parenting another man's child.
Artificial insemination statutes should contain provisions that set out the
steps a man must take to withdraw his consent to the artificial
insemination of his wife prior to the conception of the child. If the man
complies with the statute, he should be relieved of paternal responsibility
for the child. This may discourage a woman from conceiving a child she
is financially unable to support.
C. Physician Requirement
Under the majority of state statutes, the husband of the woman who
is artificially inseminated is only obligated to support the resulting child
if he consents to the procedure. 214 Additionally, a non-spousal sperm
donor is relieved of responsibility for the child. 5 In both circumstances,
the statutory mandates only apply if the procedure comes within the
scope of the statutes. Thus, the couple's failure to comply with the statute
results in the application of the common law presumption and the man is
presumed to be the father of the child if the child is born during the
marriage.2 16 In the same vein, as previously mentioned, if the sperm
donor fails to comply with the statutory requirements, he may be found
to be legally responsible for the support of the child. 21 7 In almost half of
the states, the statutory requirements do not apply unless a licensed
physician is involved in the process. Some statutes state that the
procedure can only be performed by a licensed physician.2 8
211 See, e.g., In re Estate of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 312 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008).
214 See supra Part III.A.
215 See supra Part IV.A.
216 Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital
Presumption, 65 MD. L. REv. 246, 248 (2006).
"' Meghan Anderson, Note, K.M. v. E. G.: Blurring the Lines of Parentage in the
Modem Courts, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 275, 283-84 (2006).211 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-772(a) (West 2004) ("A.I.D., may be
performed in this state only by persons certified to practice medicine in this
state.. . ."); See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-202(a) (2008) ("Artificial insemination of
a woman shall only be performed under the supervision of a physician licensed under
the Arkansas Medical Practices Act."); see also Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Alternative
Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. L. REv. 1641, 1649 (1984).
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The requirement of a licensed physician is an unnecessary burden
on infertile couples. Artificial insemination is not a medical procedure
that can only be safely performed by a licensed physician.2'9 Therefore,
the statutory mandate with regards to the involvement of a licensed
physician is superfluous. Moreover, the requirement that a licensed
physician perform the procedure makes the process cost prohibitive to
some couples. In response, low- or moderate-income women have an
incentive to self-inseminate using sperm donated by men they know. 221 If
those men are not statutorily protected from paternal obligations, they
may be reluctant to participate in the process. As a consequence, many
women may be denied the opportunity to have children. The physician
requirement may also negatively impact low and moderate income
couples who try to decrease costs by performing the procedure at home
using known sperm donors. In order to reduce the likelihood of this
happening, the legislatures should amend the statutes to remove the
physician requirement.
222A primary justification for the physician requirement is evidentiary.
The lack of an independent third party, like a physician, to testify makes
it difficult for a court to determine whether the child was conceived by
artificial insemination or sexual intercourse. If the child was conceived by
sexual intercourse, the man should not be permitted to disregard his
paternal obligations. Thus, it is important for the court to have proof that
the child was conceived by artificial insemination. The statutory
requirement of the involvement of a licensed physician will enable the
court to resolve "he said, she said" situations.
It is clear that an independent third party should be involved in the
process in order to avoid fraud and other deceptions. Nonetheless, there
is no compelling reason why that person has to be a licensed physician or
anyone else with a medical background. In the alternative, the statutes
could contain a presumption that if a child was conceived without the
involvement of a licensed physician, the child was conceived by sexual
intercourse. The statutes could mandate that in order to rebut the
presumption and take advantage of the statutory protections, the man
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child was conceived
by artificial insemination. This approach would lessen the incidents of
fraud and reduce the costs involved in the artificial insemination process.
"9 Elizabeth Ann Pitrolo, Comment, The Birds, the Bees, and the Deep Freeze: Is There
International Consensus in the Debate over Assisted Reproductive Technologies? 19 HOUS. J.
INT'L L. 147, 151 (1996) (citing LORI B. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS 179-80 (1984)).
21 Marc E. Elovitz, Reforming the Law to Respect Families Created by Lesbian and Gay
People, 3J.L. & POL'y 431, 442 n.49 (1995); see also Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral,
Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and
Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAULJ. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 163-64 (2000).
22' See King, supra note 179, at 351 (listing some of the reasons why women
choose to use known sperm donors).
SeeJhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(stating twojustifications for the physician requirement).
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VI. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT'S APPROACH
A. Advantages
The approach taken by the drafters of the UPA is more reflective of
our current societal norms and expectations. For example, the UPA
applies to unmarried women and affords them the protections of the
223
statute. The inclusion of unmarried women enables courts to protect
more artificially conceived children. In addition, the scope of the UPA is
broad enough to be applied to cases involving same-sex couples. This fact
is critical because the use of artificial insemination by women in same-sex
relationships has increased.2  Hence, the children created within those
unions need to have the opportunity to receive financial support from
more than one adult. The UPA's approach permits the courts to overlook
the marital status of the adults and to focus upon the children's need for
support.
Another positive aspect of the UPA's approach is the recognition
that the actions of the man should be evaluated prior to and after the
birth of the artificially conceived child. According to the provisions of the
UPA, if the man consents to the artificial insemination of the woman, he
is the legal father of the resulting child. 2 5 This is consistent with the
approach taken by several state statutes. Nonetheless, the UPA goes a
step further and considers the man's conduct after the birth of the
artificially conceived child. Under the UPA, if the man acts like a father
to the child after the child's birth, he is presumed to have consented to
the child's conception. Thus, he is legally recognized as the child's
father.2 6
The UPA's approach recognizes that a man may change his mind
after he sees the child, and decide that he wants to be the child's parent.
It also acknowledges the existence of a functional or psychological
father. Further, it protects the child from being financially abandoned
by the man if the relationship between the man and the woman
deteriorates. In that circumstance, the man may use his lack of consent to
avoid financially supporting the child. The UPA's presumption, like the
common law estoppel doctrine, prevents a man from simply walking away
221 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 4 (Supp. 2009). The
language of the UPA repeatedly refers to a "man" and a "woman." See, e.g., Id. § 704,
9B U.L.A. 63.
24 Kathy T. Graham, Same-Sex Couples: Their Rights as Parents, and Their Children's
Rights as Children, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 999, 1019 (2008).
UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 703, 9B U.L.A. 63.
226 Id. § 704, 9B U.L.A. 63.
27 Nancy D. Polikoff, The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is It an
Option for Lesbian and Heterosexual Mothers? 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 375, 387-88 (1996)
(discussing functional parents); see also Kirsten Korn, Comment, The Struggle for the
Child: Preserving the Family in Adoption Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third
Parties, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1279, 1310-11 (1994) (discussing psychological parent
doctrine).
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from his responsibilities after he has acted like a parent. This approach
can be justified using the same reasoning that prevents a person from
returning a child after the adoption is final.
The UPA's approach attempts to fairly balance the man's
reproductive rights against the child's right to financial support. The U.S.
• 1 , • -- 220
Supreme Court has recognized a person's right to procreate. In the
• , 230
same vein, a person has a right not to procreate. To prevent a man
from becoming a parent involuntarily, the UPA gives him a reasonable
time to challenge paternity as long as certain factors are in place.23 That
approach protects a man from being forced to be a parent to a child that
he did not conceive using his genetic material and a child that he did not
consent to have conceived. The primary advantage of this approach is
that it will deter women from using deception to get a man to financially
232
support a child.
Finally, the UPA's approach is flexible. It addresses contingencies
that are ignored by the majority of state statutes. The drafters of the UPA
appear to have anticipated some of the scenarios that could occur in a
real life situation. First, the UPA's approach recognizes that a man may
change his mind after he consents to the artificial insemination of the
woman. Consequently, the UPA's approach gives the man the
opportunity to withdraw his consent.2 33 The woman should have the right
to continue the process, but she should not be able to obligate the man
to be recognized as the resulting child's legal father. Under the UPA's
approach, the man's consent is also eliminated by divorce2 4 or death.235
Both of those situations will adversely impact the child. Therefore, if the
child has not yet been conceived, the change of circumstances should
impact the man's paternal obligations. After the man consents to the
artificial insemination of the woman, if their circumstances change, they
should be given the opportunity to rethink their decision to conceive a
child using artificial insemination.
B. Disadvantages
A major shortcoming of the UPA is that it does not specifically
mention same-sex couples in its provisions. Although application of the
statute is not limited to married couples, the language of the statute
228 See Kelly Bennison, Comment, No Deposit No Return: The Adoption Dilemma, 16
NOvA L. REv. 909, 916 (1992).
Kimberly Berg, Note, Special Respect: For Embryos and Progenitors, 74 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 506, 508-09 (2006).
30 Joseph Russell Falasco, Frozen Embryos and Gamete Providers' Rights: A Suggested
Model for Embryo Disposition, 45JURIMETRICSJ. 273, 276-79 (2005).
211 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705 (a)-(b), 9B U.L.A. 64.
232 See In re Marriage of Witbeck-Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122, 123 (Il1. App. Ct.
1996).
2s1 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACr§ 706(b), 9B U.L.A. 65.
214 Id. § 706(a), 9B U.L.A. 65.
Id. § 707, 9B U.L.A. 66.
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236
states that it applies to situations involving men and women. Thus, in
some cases, the interests of children born to same-sex couples will not be
protected. For example, if an unmarried woman is in a relationship with
an unmarried man and he consents to the artificial insemination of the
woman, he is financially responsible for the child. On the other hand,
nothing in the UPA indicates that a woman who consents to the artificial
insemination of her female partner will be held to the same standard. In
order to offer protection to the maximum number of children, the UPA
should be amended to apply to any two consenting adults who agree to
conceive a child together using artificial insemination.
The UPA states that the sperm donor can never be the parent of the
artificially conceived child. 7 Courts may be reluctant to hold that a
biological parent does not have parental rights. Thus, a better
approach may be the one taken by the Florida legislature. Under that
statute, the state recognizes the parental rights of the sperm donor, but
requires him to waive those rights prior to donating sperm.239 This
amendment will remove all possibility of a sperm donor petitioning the
court for the right to be a part of the life of the artificially conceived
child. Hence, the couple will have the opportunity to raise the child
without outside interference. Additionally, it will save the child from
being involved in a custody battle.
According to the UPA, the man must consent to the artificial
insemination and intend to parent the child.2 40 The disadvantage of this
approach is that it puts the burden on the woman to prove that the man
should be financially responsible for the child. If the man consents to the
artificial insemination of the woman, his intent to parent should be
presumed. Equity mandates that he should have to prove that he never
intended to be a parent to the artificially conceived child. The better
approach would be to amend the language of the UPA to make consent
alone enough. When a man consents to the artificial insemination of a
woman with whom he has a relationship, the expectation is that he
intends to take paternal responsibility for the child. The UPA should not
contain a loophole that permits the man to escape his child support
obligations. The next Part makes suggestions on ways the current system
can be modified to promote the best interests of the artificially conceived
child.
236 Id. § 704(a)-(b), 9B U.L.A. 63.
"7 Id. § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001) ("A donor is not a parent of a child conceived
by means of assisted reproduction.").
2 See Welborn v. Doe, 394 S.E.2d 732, 733-34 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
the Virginia statute did not terminate the sperm donor's parental fights).
239 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 2005) ("The donor of any egg, sperm, or
preembryo... shall relinquish all maternal or paternal tights and obligations with
respect to the donation or the resulting children."); see also Budnick v. Silverman, 805
So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) ("[T]he donor is legally bound to give
away any rights as a parent.").
0 UNIr. PARE NrAGE ACT § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 63 (Supp. 2009).
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
All states should enact statutes that allocate the paternal obligations
of both the husbands of artificially inseminated women and the sperm
donors. Those statutes should attempt to balance the reproductive rights
of the men involved in the process and the best interests of the children
created as a consequence of the process. Further, in passing statutes, the
legislators should seek to achieve specific goals.
A. Regulating the Paternity of Husbands
A paternity adjudication results in a great deal of emotional and
financial responsibility.2 41 Parents are responsible for caring for their
children from birth until the age of majority.242 If the child is born with a
physical, mental, or developmental disability, the parental obligation may
last for the life of the child.243 Thus, it is crucial that the husbands of
women who conceive through artificial insemination using donor sperm
are not forced to be fathers to children without their consent. In order to
achieve that goal, statutes must be enacted stating that the husband is not
legally responsible for the child unless he gave written consent prior to
the insemination of his wife. Because circumstances change, the husband
should be permitted to withdraw his consent prior to the child's
conception. The husband should have the burden of proving that he
withdrew his consent before the child was conceived.4 In the alternate,
the legislature should make the consent good for only a certain length of
time. After that time period expires, the husband should be given the
option of renewing his consent. If the husband fails to renew his consent
within a reasonable period of time after the expiration of his initial
consent, he should not be recognized as the legal father of the artificially
conceived child.
B. Regulating the Paternity of Sperm Donors
The primary goal of any statutory scheme dealing with assisted
reproduction should be to insure that infertile couples in committed
41 N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 359 (Colo. 2000) ("The determination of
parenthood includes the right to parenting time; the right to direct the child's
activities; the right to make decisions regarding the control, education, and health of
the child; and the right to the child's services and earnings. Legal fatherhood
imposes significant obligations as well, including the obligation of support and the
obligation to teach moral standards, religious beliefs, and good citizenship." (citation
omitted) (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1989))).
2142 Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child Front Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand
Alone?, 57 LA. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1996).
2 43 Sande L. Buhai, Parental Support of Adult Children with Disabilities, 91 MINN. L.
REv. 710, 723-24 (2007).
2144 This is the approach the Court adopted in K.S. v. G.S., 440 A.2d 64, 68 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981).
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relationships are able to obtain sperm without worrying about the donor
asserting his parental rights. Consequently, couples should be defined
broadly to include persons who are married, in civil unions, or domestic
partnerships. 245 This broad definition will insure that persons in same-sex
relationships are protected.2 46 The rights of the husband or partner of the
inseminated woman should be paramount to those of the man donating
the sperm. To achieve that goal in these types of situations, the sperm
donor should never be considered to be a parent. Since the sperm donor
is never legally recognized as the parent, he does not have to waive his
parental rights and the woman's husband or partner does not have to
adopt the child. This is the law under the UPA and in the majority of
states that have implemented statutes addressing the issue.247
An equally important goal of the statutory regime should be to
permit unmarried women to control their reproduction by being able to
obtain sperm without worrying about the donor interfering with their
248parental rights. In order to accomplish that goal, at the time of
donation, the sperm donor should be required to sign a written
document waiving his parental rights and agreeing that he is not the
father of any children conceived using his sperm. However, with the
permission of the woman, the donor should be permitted to reinstate his
parental rights prior to the birth of the child. This requirement will also
insure that sperm donors are able to donate without fear of being liable
for child support and other parental obligations. This requirement
should apply to known and unknown donors. Unlike in the situation
dealing with persons in married or committed relationships, the sperm
donor should be recognized as having parental rights that he can waive.
The justification for the difference in treatment is to encourage co-
parenting situations if the parties think that is appropriate. For example,
an unmarried woman and an unmarried man may want to raise a child
45 1 have excluded unmarried cohabitants from this protection because they
have the option of entering into marriage.
216 Currently, in the majority of states, same-sex couples are not able to avail
themselves of the safeguards included in the artificial insemination statutes. Kira
Horstmeyer, Note, Putting Your Eggs in Someone Else's Basket: Inserting Uniformity into the
Uniform Parentage Act's Treatment of Assisted Reproduction, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 671,
675 (2007).
27 See In reK.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1033 (Kan. 2007).
248 The current statutory regime does not afford the unmarried woman much
protection. See Vickie L. Henry, Note, A Tale of Three Women: A Survey of the Rights and
Responsibilities of Unmarried Women Who Conceive by Alternative Insemination and a Model
for Legislative Reform, 19 AM.J.L. & MED. 285, 294 (1993) (asserting that existing laws
do not protect the familial expectations of unmarried women who conceive using
artificial insemination).
241 See Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521, 522 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (enforcing
sperm donor's written waiver of his parental rights to a child conceived by artificial
insemination).
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250Ojointly even though they are not in a relationship. In the cases involving
married persons and persons in committed relationships, the child will
already have two persons filling the parental roles. Thus, in order to
avoid confusion, the law should not give the sperm donor any
opportunity to claim his parental rights. The most effective way to
eliminate that possibility is to strip him of all parental rights. In situations
involving unmarried people, legislatures should leave open the possibility
of joint parenting by giving the parties the option of leaving the donor's
parental rights in place.
A final goal with regard to sperm donors should be to insure that
known sperm donors who do not deposit their sperm with a licensed
physician or in a medical facility are protected from child support and
other parental obligations. That goal may be attained by establishing a
two-prong system. If the recipient of the sperm is married, the donor will
never be considered to be the father. If the recipient of the sperm is
unmarried, there is a rebuttable presumption that the sperm donor is
not the parent of the child. That presumption may be rebutted by
showing that the sperm donor agreed to be a parent to the artificially
conceived child.
C. Protecting the Children
The goal of applying the "best interests" of the child standard should
be to ensure that the child is emotionally and physically healthy, that the
child is financially supported, and that the child is in a stable
environment. In order to accomplish that goal, the courts should make
sure that the artificially conceived child is financially supported by at least
two parents.251 Nonetheless, in order to live a quality life, the child needs
more than economic support. When possible, the courts should take the
steps necessary to preserve the pattern of interaction between the child
and the parents after the relationship between the parents has
deteriorated. One way to achieve these goals is to expand the definition
of fatherhood so that the court can apply different standards to
determine the paternity of the men involved in the process. 252 The issue
of redefining fatherhood is addressed in the next Part.
20 Some single lesbian women are choosing to co-parent with single gay men.
E.g., Catherine Hall, My Future Family, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 7, 2009, http://www.guard
ian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2009/feb/07/family4.
2 Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARv. L. REV. 835, 894-95 (2000).
252 Chris W. Altenbernd, Quasi-Marital Children: The Common Law's Failure in
Privette and Daniel Calls for Statutory Reform, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REX'. 219, 225-27 (1999)
(discussing several different definitions of "father").
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VIII. MY PROPOSAL (STANDARDS TO APPLY
IN ALLOCATING PATERNAL OBLIGATIONS)
State legislatures should modify the current statutes addressing the
rights and responsibilities of the men involved in the artificial
insemination process in order to more accurately accommodate the
current state of the family.253 Legislators cannot anticipate and cover all
contingencies. Consequently, courts should be given the flexibility to
determine paternity by relying upon various standards consistent with
family law principles derived from existing statutes and case law. The
overriding objective should be to promote the best interests of the child
• • • 254
conceived by artificial insemination. It is usually in the best interests of
a child and society to have at least two adults financially responsible for
the child's support.255 This is true even if the adults have agreed not to
live together. In addition, it is in the child's best interests for the court to
recognize and respect the relationships that the child has established
with the adults in his or her life.
Under the present system, there is a possibility that an artificially
conceived child may be deemed legally fatherless. For example, if a
husband does not consent to the artificial insemination of his wife, he is
256not legally recognized as the father of the resulting child. Based upon
the same statutory regime, the sperm donor is not classified as the legal
father. Thus, in a situation involving a nonconsenting husband, the
artificially conceived child does not have a legal father. Courts cannot
force the adults in the relationship to stay together for the children.
Nevertheless, the courts can take steps to ensure that children conceived
using artificial insemination have at least two legal parents. In the context
of paternity, that goal can be achieved by permitting courts to broaden
the definition of fatherhood by applying multi-factor tests for
determining paternity instead of relying on bright line rules. Some
current statutes, cases, and legal scholarship acknowledge that there are
several different ways for a man to be identified as a legal father.1'- When
allocating paternity, courts should use those methods to ensure that the
artificially conceived child will have a legal father.
2 Contra Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34
U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 683 (2001) (defending the traditional parent rights doctrine
and definition of parenthood).
254 See Sarah McGinnis, Comment, You Are Not the Father: How State Paternity Laws
Protect (and Fail to Protect) the Best Interests of Children, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POE", &
L. 311, 325-30 (2007) (contending that giving the court too much discretion in
paternity determinations may not be in the best interests of children).
1 See C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 825 (N.J.Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977) ("It is in a
child's best interests to have two parents whenever possible.").
256 Gordon-Ceresky, supra note 30, at 256.
257 See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM1. STUD.
231, 235-37 (2007) (advocating for a broad definition of fatherhood, including social
fatherhood).
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I do not seek to join the ranks of those scholars and commentators
advocating for co-parenting or nonexclusive parenting.2 58 My focus is
upon ensuring that the artificially conceived child has two legally
recognized parents. I am unwilling to throw out the two-parent model of
parenting.' I am proposing that the definition of paternity be expanded
to include a man who may not be genetically related to the artificially
conceived child.260 Hence, I propose that biology not be the sole
indicator of paternity. Courts should apply a series of tests or standards
when adjudicating paternity. If the man's paternity can be established
under one or more of those tests or standards, he should be recognized
as the child's legal father. As a consequence, that man should be
financially obligated to support the child and should be entitled to all of
the benefits of the father-child relationship. This approach is not radical
because courts have engaged in a similar analysis in order to decide
maternity in cases involving children created as the result of surrogacy
261
arrangements.
My proposal is limited to situations involving children created by
artificial insemination. Under the current statutory regime in most states,
the artificial insemination statutes do not apply unless the procedure is
performed by a licensed physician. On the contrary, for the provisions of
my proposal to apply to the situation, the procedure does not have to be
262performed by a licensed physician or an independent third party. One
of the key justifications for the licensed physician requirement is the
need to insure that the child was conceived by artificial insemination
263instead of by sexual intercourse. My proposal starts with the
presumption that the child was conceived by artificial insemination. The
person challenging the application of the proposal has the burden of
proving that the child was conceived by natural insemination. My
258 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 216, at 268-70; Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads:
Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 811 (2006); Donald C.
Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y
29, 79 (2003); Kris Franklin, Note, "A Family Like Any Other Family:" Alternative Methods
of Defining Family in Law, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOc. CHANGE 1027, 1048-49, 1074
(1991).
259 But see, Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV.
879, 948 (1984).
260 Carmel B. Sella, When a Mother Is a Legal Stranger to Her Child: The Law's
Challenge to the Lesbian Nonbiological Mother, I UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 135, 142-46 (1991);
see also Maggie Manternach, Note, Where Is My Other Mommy?: Applying the Presumed
Father Provision of the Uniform Parentage Act to Recognize the Rights of Lesbian Mothers and
Their Children, 9J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 385, 407-08 (2005).
26' Emily Stark, Comment, Born to No Mother: In Re Roberto D.B. and Equal
Protection for Gestational Surrogates Rebutting Maternity, 16 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POI'Y &
L. 283, 293-307 (2008) (evaluating different tests courts have relied upon to
determine the legal mother of a child born as the result of a surrogate arrangement).
22 Most of the artificial insemination statutes contain a physician requirement.
See sura Part V.C.
SeeJhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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proposal is based upon some of the theories put forth by the courts and
264
other legal scholars. The premise of my proposal is that, in order to
promote the best interests of the artificially conceived child, the courts
should recognize the relationship the child has established with the man,
and enforce the paternal agreements made between the artificially
inseminated woman and the man. The key components of my proposal
are as follows.
A. The Paternity of the Husband of the Artificially Inseminated Woman
Courts are frequently asked to adjudicate paternity in these types of
cases in three contexts. In the first scenario, the husband does not want
to be recognized as the father of the artificially conceived child.
265
Scenario two cases are litigated because the inseminated wife challenges
266her husband's claim of parenthood. The possibility also exists for a
third scenario in which both the artificially inseminated wife and her
husband object to the husband being adjudicated as the father of the
child. The recommendations in this Section apply to all three scenarios.
The enumerated classifications were derived using cases, statutes, and
theories put forth by other legal scholars. In some instances, the
definitions of certain terms have been modified.
1. Scenario One Cases
In some cases, the husband attempts to disclaim responsibility for
the artificially conceived child. Since he does not have a genetic
connection to the child, the man may feel that he should not have to
provide support for the child. These cases typically arise because the
husband and the artificially inseminated woman have separated or
261divorced . In deciding whether or not to classify the husband as the
child's legal father, courts should determine if he consented to the
child's conception. If the man consented by action or deed, he should be
legally obligated to provide financial support for the child, and the child
should be considered to be his legal heir. In the alternative, the court
should presume that, since he was married to the child's mother at the
time the child was conceived, the man is the child's legal father.
2 See Shoshana L. Gillers, Note, A Labor Theory of Legal Parenthood, 110 YALE L.J.
691, 691, 706-09 (2001); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987) (applying the equitable parent doctrine); Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth:
Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 909, 913 (2006); June
Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of Family Identity, 65
LA. L. REv. 1295, 1297 (2005).
2 See, e.g., In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 878 (S.C. 1987); In re Marriage of
Witbeck-Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122, 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
266 See, e.g., Lane v. Lane, 912 P.2d 290, 293 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996); State ex rel. H. v.
P., 457 N.Y.S.2d 488, 489 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
267 See, e.g., In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d at 877; Laura G. v. Peter G., 830 N.Y.S.2d
496, 497 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
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a. Paternity by Consent
If the woman's husband consents to her artificial insemination, he
should be adjudicated the father of the resulting child. Thus, he should
not be permitted to object to the court designating him as the father of
the child. Consent should be broadly interpreted to include written,
implied, and oral consent. In order for the husband's consent to be
legally recognized, he must give informed consent.268 The person seeking
to prove non-written consent must do so by submitting clear and
convincing evidence of that fact. Once the husband gives written
consent, that consent should be effective for one year. Prior to the
expiration of that time period, the husband should not be permitted to
unilaterally withdraw his consent. At the end of the one year period, the
written consent must be renewed within a reasonable period of time
based upon the particular circumstances of the case. If the consent is not
renewed within that time period, the husband should be deemed to not
have consented to the artificial insemination of his wife.
b. Paternity by Presumption
This long-standing legal doctrine usually applies when the issue deals
269.
with paternity. Under the traditional version of the doctrine, a husband
was presumed to be the biological father of his wife's children as long as
they were born during the course of the marriage.2 0 Initially, strict
evidentiary requirements prevented the presumption from being
rebutted because the courts wanted to preserve the sanctity of marriage
and to protect children from being classified as non-marital children.
Eventually, the courts permitted interested parties, including the
husband, the wife, and the child(ren) to rebut the presumption of the
272husband's paternity. In some cases, the man claiming to be the child's
biological father was permitted to successfully rebut the presumption.
The presumption may be rebutted by showing that the husband is not
26' This means that the husband must be told that, if he consents to the artificial
insemination, he will be legally responsible for the child.
2" Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital
Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 562 (2000).
270 Mary Louise Fellows, A Feminist Interpretation of the Law of Legitimacy, 7 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 195, 195-96 (1998).
27' Lord Mansfield's Rule barred either spouse from testifying that a child born
during the marriage was illegitimate. See Hubin, supra note 258, at 47-48; Pendleton,
supra note 129, at 2824-25. In order to rebut the presumption, the person had to
prove that the husband was physically unable to procreate or that the husband was
not in a position to have sex with his wife during the time the child was conceived.
Jacinta M. Testa, Comment, Finishing Off Forced Fatherhood: Does It Really Matter if Blood
or DNA Evidence Can Rebut the Presumption of Paternity?, 108 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1295, 1298
(2004).
"' Sunny J. Jansma, Note, Family Law-Presumption of Paternity-Denying a
Biological Father Standing to Establish His Paternity of a Child Who Has a Presumed Father,
Under Texas Family Code Sections 11. 03(a)(7) and 12.06(a), Violates the Texas Due Course of
Law Guarantee, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 821, 825-26 (1994).
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the biological father of the child.2 73 In light of the advances in DNA
274testing, it is relatively easy to prove or disprove the husband's paternity.
In cases dealing with children conceived by artificial insemination,
there is no need to do DNA testing because the wife and the husband
readily admit that he does not have a biological connection to the child.
In response to this dilemma, some courts have adopted the best interests
marital presumption doctrine. Under that doctrine, like the traditional
approach, the woman's husband is presumed to be the father of all
children conceived by her during their marriage. The main difference is
that the presumption can be rebutted only if it is in the child's best
interests to discover that someone other than the husband is the child's
biological father.275
The nonconsenting husband of the artificially inseminated woman
should be classified as the presumptive father of the child as long as the
child was conceived during the marriage. The husband should only be
permitted to rebut the presumption of his paternity if it is in the best
interests of the child to permit it. Allowing the rebuttal should only be
considered to be in the child's best interests if there is another man who
may legally be recognized as the father and that man is willing to act as a
father to the child. In deciding whether or not to permit the
presumption to be rebutted, the court should consider several factors,
including the child's relationship with the presumptive father and the
child's relationship with the man who is willing to parent if the
presumption of paternity is rebutted.
The only persons who should be allowed to rebut the presumption
of the husband's paternity should be the child's biological mother, an
independent representative of the child, the mother's husband, or the
man seeking to be recognized as the legal parent. Since the
nonconsenting husband would not have a biological connection to the
child, this presumption standard is different from the traditional marital
presumption. As stated earlier, under that presumption, the man only
had to provide proof that he was not the biological father of the child
276and he was released from all parental obligations to the child. In cases
involving artificially conceived children, in order to rebut the
presumption, the husband should have to present evidence indicating
27' The marital presumption of paternity was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). At that time, the Court rejected the
notion that a child could have two legal fathers. Id. at 118.
274 Roberts, supra note 23, at 56-57.
275 See Debi McRae, Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Best Interests Marital
Presumption of Paternity: It Is Actually in the Best Interests of Children to Divorce the Current
Application of the Best Interests Marital Presumption of Paternity, 5 WHrTtERJ. CHILD &
FA. ADvoc. 345, 347-49 (2006) (discussing the evolution of the "Best Interests
Marital Presumption of Paternity" and arguing that it is always in the best interests to
rebut the presumption).
276 Pendleton, supra note 129, at 2830-34.
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that he did not consent to the creation of the child or indicating that he
did not intend to parent the child.
In order to promote the best interests of the child, the courts should
make it difficult for the husband of the artificially inseminated woman to
dispute his paternity. This Section examines just two standards, paternity
by consent and paternity by presumption, the courts can apply to achieve
that goal. The court should be just as diligent when the artificially
inseminated woman tries to object to her husband being adjudicated as
the legal father of her child.
2. Scenario Two Cases
The cases in which artificially inseminated women oppose their
husbands being declared the legal fathers of their children often involve
custody and visitation issues.277 In that type of case, the man usually asks
the court for either joint custody of the artificially conceived child or for
278liberal visitation. The man is perfectly willing to provide financial
support for the child. Nonetheless, the woman would prefer that the man
not be permitted to have contact with the child. In order to accomplish
that objective, the woman may focus upon the fact that the man is not
genetically related to the child. The woman may employ that tactic
because the rights of a legal parent frequently supersede the rights of a
279person who is a legal stranger to the child. Since, in most of these types
of cases, the woman has permitted the man to establish a relationship
with the child, the court should evaluate the nature of that relationship
to determine if it is in the child's best interests to recognize it.
a. Paternity by Equity
One of the first courts to recognize paternity by equity was the
280Michigan Court of Appeals. In the case before that court, the husband
wanted to be adjudicated the father of a child born during his marriage
to a woman who claimed that he was not the child's biological father.
The Court relied upon the equitable parent doctrine to conclude that
282the man should be treated as the child's natural father. Under the
doctrine, a man may be treated as the legal father of a child born during
his marriage if the following conditions exist:
(1) [T]he husband and the child mutually acknowledge a
relationship as father and child, or the mother of the child has
cooperated in the development of such a relationship over a period
271 See, e.g., Lane v. Lane, 912 P.2d 290, 293 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
271 See, e.g., State ex rel. H. v. P., 457 N.Y.S.2d 488, 489 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
279 John DeWitt Gregory, Whose Child Is It, Anyway: The Demise of Family Autonomy
and ParentalAuthority, 33 FAM. L.Q. 833, 837 (1999).
28 Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); see also
Carolee Kvoriak Lezuch, Comment, Michigan's Doctrine of Equitable Parenthood: A
Doctrine Best Forgotten, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1529, 1529-30 (1999) (advocating the
abolishment of the doctrine of equitable parenthood).
21' Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d at 517.
2 Id. at 519.
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of time prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce, (2) the
husband desires to have the rights afforded to a parent, and (3) the
husband is willing to take on the responsibility of paying child
support.
2 3
Once the court declares a man to be an equitable parent, the man is
treated just like a natural parent. As a consequence, he has the same
parental rights and responsibilities as any other parent. 2" The application
of the doctrine has been limited to situations involving married
285persons.
In situations involving artificially conceived children, the courts
should evaluate the husband's actions after the birth of the child to
determine if equity mandates that he be adjudicated the parent of the
child. The wife should not be permitted to deny her husband's paternity
after she has encouraged him to establish a relationship with the child.
That outcome would not be fair to the husband or the child. Further, if
the woman did not object to her husband creating a relationship with the
child, fairness dictates that the court legitimize that relationship by
adjudicating the husband to be the child's legal father. As a result, if an
informal father-child relationship has been created, the court should
recognize that relationship in order to promote the child's best interests
and to be fair to the man.
286b. Paternity by Psychology
One of the main advocates for recognition of a psychological parent
is Professor Katharine T. Bartlett. Professor Bartlett defines the
psychological parent in the context of a nonexclusive parenting
situation. 2 She opines that the job of raising children should not be left
to the exclusive domain of one man and one woman. Thus, she
acknowledges that a child may have more than two adults acting as
parents. Nonetheless, Professor Bartlett concedes that the legal parent
should have the responsibility and the authority to make decisions
regarding the child. As a consequence, Professor Bartlett appears to limit
her psychological parent theory to situations involving visitation.288
According to Professor Bartlett, a psychological parent is an adult
who assists in the provision of necessities that would typically be supplied
by the child's nuclear family.2s9 These needs may be physical, emotional
and or social. Professor Bartlett has suggested the use of a three-part test
283 Id.
2'4 E.g., York v. Morofsky, 571 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
285 Van v. Zahoik, 597 N.W.2d 15, 23 (Mich. 1999).
286 See OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (2007) (statute acknowledges that child-parent
relationship may be created by establishing emotional ties with a non-biological
child); See also In re Marriage of Sorensen, 906 P.2d 838, 840-41 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)
(recognizing the stepmother as the child's psychological parent over the objection of
the biological parent).
117 Bartlett, supra note 259, at 946-48.
... See id.
'89 Id. at 946.
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2901to identify a potential psychological parent. In order to be classified as
a psychological parent, the adult must satisfy three conditions. First, the
adult must be in physical possession of the child for at least six months
291prior to seeking parental status. Second, when seeking parental status,
the adult must be motivated by a desire to take care of the child and the
child must consider that adult to be his or her parent.292 Finally, the adult
seeking parental status has the burden of proving that his or her
relationship with the child was the result of the legal parent's consent or
a court order.93
I am proposing a slight variation on Professor Bartlett's
psychological parent theory. In particular, I would eliminate the third
condition of her test. The mother of the artificially conceived child
should not have the power to dictate the conditions under which her
husband can have a relationship with a child that she conceives during
their marriage. Professor Bartlett was envisioning that her theory would
be applied outside of the context of a marital relationship. Thus, in that
context, it would make sense to permit the legal parent to control the
contact that other adults have with the child. With regards to situations
involving the parental rights of the husband of an artificially inseminated
woman, the woman's wishes should not supplant the man's rights or the
child's welfare.
The husband of an artificially inseminated woman should be
classified as the psychological father of the resulting child if he resides
with the child or has contact with the child for a reasonable period of
time given the nature of the relationship that he maintains with the
child's mother. I am reluctant to require the man to have to be in
physical possession of the child for at least six months because it gives the
inseminated woman too much control over the situation. If the woman
and man separate or divorce when the child is only five months old, he
may not be able to satisfy Professor Bartlett's test. Rendering a child
legally fatherless because the mother successfully prevents her estranged
husband from having contact with the child is not in the child's best
interests. Instead of time limits, the focus should be on the emotional ties
294between the man and the artificially conceived child. If those ties are
strong, the man should be determined to be the child's legal father.
3. Scenario Three Cases
A possibility always exists that the artificially inseminated woman and
her husband may agree that the husband should not be recognized as
the resulting child's legal father. The court should not honor this type of
agreement unless it is in the best interests of the child to do so. In
2' Id. at 946-47.
2" Id. at 946.
21 Id. at 947.
293 Id.
29 See OR REV. STAT. § 109.119 (2007) (statute acknowledges that child-parent
relationship may be created by establishing emotional ties with non-biological child).
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deciding whether or not to designate the woman's husband as the child's
father, the court should examine the parties' actions prior to and after
the conception and birth of the child. If the circumstances indicate that
the husband anticipated being the child's father or that he actually
served in that capacity, the court should allocate paternal obligations to
the inseminated woman's husband.
a. Paternity by Estoppel
Paternity by estoppel has been recognized by the courts and
295endorsed by legal scholars. As indicated in Part II, courts have relied on
estoppel to place parental responsibility on nonconsenting husbands in
296cases involving children conceived using artificial insemination.
Basically, when a husband acts in such a way as to lead his wife to believe
that he is in agreement with her being artificially inseminated and that
he plans to parent the child, he is estopped from claiming that he did
not consent. V 7 Hence, he is the legal father of the resulting child. The
parent by estoppel doctrine has been articulated in several different298
ways. The approach of the court that heard Brown v. Brown is illustrative
of one application of the doctrine . 9
In Brown, a husband who did not give written consent to his wife's
artificial insemination was held to be the father of the resulting child
based upon the estoppel doctrine. 30 0 The court based its decision on the
fact that the typical elements of equitable estoppel-representation,
reliance, and detriment-were present.30 ' After reviewing the facts, the
court concluded that, since the husband knew that his wife was being
artificially inseminated and did nothing to discourage her from
15 This approach has been advocated by Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have
Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and
Other NontraditionalFamilies, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 491-502 (1990).290 E.g., Laura G. v. Peter G., 830 N.Y.S.2d 496, 502 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
297 Id.
211 Caroline P. Blair, Note, It's More Than a One-Night Stand: Why a Promise to Parent
Should Obligate a Former Lesbian Partner to Pay Child Support in the Absence of a Statutory
Requirement, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 465, 481-82 (2006); see also Hopkins, supra note
187, at 234.
125 S.W.3d 840 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003).
During the marriage, the wife, Kathy Brown, was artificially inseminated with
donor sperm and gave birth to twins. She conceded that the husband, Hugh Brown,
did not give written consent to the artificial insemination. Id. at 841-43. However,
Kathy contended that, based upon Hugh's actions before and after the child's birth,
he should not be permitted to deny his paternity. Id. at 842-43.
"' Id. at 843. ("(1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must
intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting
estoppel has a right to believe the other party so intended; (3) the party asserting
estoppel must be ignorant of the facts; (4) the party asserting estoppel must rely on
the other's conduct to his detriment." (citing Office of Child Support Enforcement v.
King, 100 S.W.3d 95 (Ark. Ct. App 2003))).
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undergoing the procedure, he should be prevented from denying his
302paternity of the two children:.
Another demonstration of the application of the estoppel doctrine is
the approach suggested by the American Law Institute (ALI) .f In the
context of determining parentage for child support purposes, the ALI
304
recommended the adoption of the parent by estoppel doctrine. When
implementing the doctrine, the ALI suggests considering several factors
to decide whether or not the person should be considered a parent by
estoppel. First, the court should attempt to discover if the person agreed
to support the child. This agreement may be explicit or implicit.30 ' This
condition is similar to the written and implied consent components
included in the various artificial insemination statutes. 306 Second, the
court should determine if the child was born during the marriage or
cohabitation of the person to be estopped and the person asserting
307
estoppel v. If the child was not born to married or cohabitating parties,
the child must have been conceived in accordance with an agreement
between the parties promising to parent the child .
Courts applying this standard should examine the actions of the
nonconsenting husband prior to the conception and birth of the child. If
the husband acted in such a way that a reasonable person would
conclude that he consented to the artificial insemination and intended
to parent the resulting child, he should be estopped from denying
02 The court stated, "(1) appellant knew the facts, i.e., he knew that appellee was
having the artificial-insemination procedure performed; (2) appellant acted as if he
agreed to the procedure, accepted the children as his own, and showed every
intention to support them, i.e., leading appellee to believe that he so intended; (3)
appellee was ignorant of the facts asserted by appellant at the hearing, i.e., that he did
not know she was having the procedure and did not plan to treat the children as his
own; and (4) appellee relied to her detriment on appellant's conduct, i.e., she
proceeded with the artificial insemination, fully expecting appellant to support the
children as his own." Id. at 844.
30' THE AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (2000)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
304 PRINCIPLES, supra note 303, § 2.03(1); Louise McGuire, Comment, Parental
Rights of Gay and Lesbian Couples: Will Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage Make a Difference?, 43
DUQ. L. REv. 273, 277-78 (2005).
305 PRINCIPLES, Supra note 303, §3.03(1)(a); Grace Ganz Blumberg, Legal
Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal Relationships: The 2003 California Domestic Partner Rights
and Responsibilities Act in Comparative Civil Rights and Family Law Perspective, 51 UCLA L.
RE,. 1555, 1604 (2004).
Bridget R. Penick, Note, Give the Child a Legal Father: A Plea for Iowa to Adopt a
Statute Regulating Artificial Insemination by Anonymous Donor, 83 IOWA L. REV. 633, 651-
54 (1998).
PRINCIPLES, supra note 303, § 3.03(1) (b).
PRINCIPLES, supra note 303, § 2.03; Leslie Bender, "To Err Is Human" ART Mix-
Ups: A Labor-Based, Relational Proposal, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 443, 470 (2006); see
also Deborah L. Forman, Same-Sex Partners: Strangers, Third Parties, or Parents? The
Changing Legal Landscape and the Struggle for Parental Equality, 40 FAM. L.Q. 23, 42
(2006).
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paternity. °9 Likewise, under those circumstances, the biological mother
of the child should be estopped from claiming that her nonconsenting
husband is not the father of her artificially conceived child. 310 The court
should apply the traditional estoppel principles-representation,
reliance, and detriment.3n Paternity by estoppel should result if the
husband, through word or deed, represented the intent to parent the
artificially conceived child, the woman permitted herself to be
inseminated in reasonable reliance upon that representation, and the
woman and or child will be harmed if the husband is not adjudicated the
father of the child. The person seeking to establish paternity by estoppel
should have the burden of proving these elements.
b. Paternity by Function
The functional parent is similar to the psychological parent. 2 The
313focus is upon the actions the person takes after the birth of the child .
This theory of parentage has been put forth by Professor Nancy Polikoff.
According to Professor Polikoff, in order for a person to be classified as a
functional parent, the child's legally recognized parent must create a
314
relationship between the child and that person. In addition, the legal
parent must intend that relationship to be parental in nature. Finally, the
person must maintain a functional parental relationship with the child.
When evaluating paternity under this standard, courts should focus
upon the husband's actions after the birth of the artificially conceived
child. If the nonconsenting husband acts as a father to the child, his
paternity should be established by function.3 6 To function as a parent,
the nonconsenting husband should have to reside in the home with the
• 317
child for a reasonable period of time, provide financial support for the
child, and hold the child out as his child. In essence, the man has to
function as a father by establishing some type of relationship with the
R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 923, 925, 928 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Gursky v. Gursky, 242
N.Y.S.2d 406, 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
3. See State ex rel. H. v. P., 457 N.Y.S.2d 488, 493 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding
that wife was estopped from denying husband's paternity).
31 Hopkins supra note 187, at 233-34.
312 See Bartlett, supra note 259, at 946-48.
.3 See In re Marriage of Sorensen, 906 P.2d 838, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)
(recognizing the stepmother as the child's psychological parent over the objection of
the biological parent).
114 Polikoff, supra note 227, at 387-88 (presenting the concept of a "functional
parent" and calling for statutory reform to protect families with same-sex parents);
and Polikoff, supra note 295, at 464, 477.
315 Polikoff, supra note 227, at 387-88; see also Craig W. Christensen, Legal
Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOzO L. REv. 1299,
1391-93 (1997).
316 Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & PoLy 47, 63-65
(2007).
"' The court should be permitted to decide what is a reasonable period of time
on a case-by-case basis.
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child.3 "' The UPA presumptive parent provision could serve as a model
for this standard.19
B. The Paternity of the Sperm Donor
With regards to sperm donors, the court should recognize three
classes of sperm donors and treat them differently with regards to
allocating paternal obligations. Those suggested classes are discussed in
this Section.
1. Class One-The Sperm Donor (Known or Unknown) and the Married or
Committed Woman
If a married or committed woman is artificially inseminated with
sperm supplied by a sperm donor who is not her husband, the sperm
donor should not be recognized as the father of the child. The sperm
donor's parental rights should be automatically terminated the moment
that he donates his sperm. Nevertheless, if a known sperm donor is
involved, the courts should enforce an agreement between the woman
and the sperm donor providing that, if the woman's husband or partner
predeceases the birth of the child, the sperm donor may be legally
recognized as the father of the child. In the absence of such an
agreement, the sperm donor should not be recognized as the legal father
of the child.
2. Class Two-The Sperm Donor (Unknown) and the Unmarried or
Uncommitted Woman
In order to protect the single woman who wants to raise her
artificially conceived child alone, the sperm donor should not be
recognized as the legal father of the child. This will also encourage men
to donate sperm without fear of being forced into parenthood. Again,
the sperm donor's rights should be automatically terminated the
moment that he donates his sperm. The single woman should only be
permitted to be artificially inseminated in a medical facility or by a
3'8 Marc R. Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale Approaches Towards Marriage Equality in
New Jersey: Is Lewis v. Harris a Dead End or Just a Detour?, 59 RUTGERS L. REv. 291, 315
(2007).
"'9 UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT (1973) 4(a), 9B U.L.A. 393 (2001) ("A man is presumed
to be the natural father of a child if: ... (4) while the child is under the age of
majority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
natural child....").
120 A committed woman is a woman who is in a civil union or a domestic
partnership. See David S. Buckel, Government Affixes a Label of Inferiority on Same-Sex
Couples When It Imposes Civil Unions & Denies Access to Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 73, 75-76 (2005) (discussing the creation of civil unions). See also Lynn D.
Wardle, Counting the Costs of Civil Unions: Some Potential Detrimental Effects on Family
Law, 11 WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 401, 403-07 (2002) (discussing the different methods of
creating domestic partnerships). A committed woman may also be a woman who is in
a long-term relationship that is "characterized by an emotional and financial
commitment and interdependence." Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 545 N.E.2d 49, 54
(N.Y. 1989).
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licensed physician if she appoints a guardian for the child to serve as the
parent in the event that something happens to her (i.e., she dies in child
birth). This requirement will ensure that at least one person is available
to care for the child. The single woman should also be required to make
321financial provisions for the child prior to being artificially inseminated .
A key criticism of this requirement may be that the law does not compel
single women who naturally conceive children to arrange alternate care
in case of their demise. In response to that criticism, I would point out
that a man who naturally conceives a child with a single woman is not
322
relieved of his paternal duties. As a result, if the woman dies during
child birth, the man is still legally required to support the child.
In exchange for having the right to exclude the biological father
from the child's life, the single woman who conceives using donor sperm
should be required to make the appropriate financial arrangements for
the support of the child. The Nadya Suleman situation exhibits why this
type of condition needs to be put in place.323 The guardian should not
have any rights or responsibilities with regards to the child during the
mother's lifetime. The guardian should serve as an honorary parent and
act as a safety net for the child . 24 In order to obtain full legal
parenthood, the guardian would have to adopt the child if the woman
dies or becomes incapacitated.
3. Class Three-The Sperm Donor (Known) and the Unmarried or
Uncommitted Woman
The courts should apply different standards to decide if the known
donor should be treated as the child's legal father.
a. Paternity by Contract
When a single woman is artificially inseminated with sperm donated
by a man she knows, the man may have contact with the child . Hence,
32' Hopefully, this will discourage situations like the case where a single woman
used in vitro fertilization to create eight children although she already had six
artificially created children. See John Rogers, California Octuplets Become Longest-Living
Set in United States (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://aol.mediresource.com/channel-
health_news details.asp?newsid= 17174.
32 Mary A. Totz, Comment, What's Good for the Goose is Good for the Gander: Toward
Recognition of Men's Reproductive Rights, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 141,158 (1994).
.23 After giving birth to fourteen children using assisted reproduction, single
mother Stileman struggled to financially provide for her children. Suleman set up a
website where she asks the public for financial contributions. See Nadya Suleman
Family Website, http://www.nadyasulemanfamily.net. See also Mike Celizic, Octuplet
Mom Defends Her "Unconventional" Choices, TODAYSHOW.coM, Feb 6, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29038814 (reporting from NBC interview predicting
that the hospital care for the octuplets could cost between $1.5 and $3 million of
public money).3" This is similar to the honorary trust some states permit persons to establish to
ensure that there is someone to take care of their pets after they die. Adam J. Hirsch,
Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 33, 98 (1999).
325 See, e.g., In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989); see alsoJacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923
A•2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
2009] 1003
HeinOnline  -- 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1003 2009
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
situations involving known sperm donors should be treated differently
from those involving anonymous sperm donors. To that end, courts
should enforce written agreements between the parties with regards to
the man's paternity.326 Hence, if the known sperm donor signs an
agreement stating that he plans to parent the child, he should be
recognized as the legal father of the child.3 The agreement to parent
should be signed prior to the conception of the child, and it should be
signed by the artificially inseminated woman and the known sperm
donor.
b. Paternity by Intent
The focus should be upon the person's behavior prior to the
conception or birth of the child. Courts have taken this approach when
determining maternity in surrogate cases.3 2 The inquiry is whether the
man acted in such a way to indicate that he intended to parent the
329child . Professor Marjorie Maguire Shultz states that legal parenthood
should be determined by evaluating the intentions of the parties.
Specifically, Professor Shultz opines, "intentions that are voluntarily
chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for ought presumptively to
determine legal parenthood.,
3 0
If prior to the conception or birth of the child, the sperm donor
took affirmative steps to indicate that he intended to parent the child, his
paternity should be recognized. In order to be classified as an intended
parent, the sperm donor should have to do more than just donate his
sperm to contribute to the child's conception. He should have to take
steps that a parent would take in preparation for the conception or birth
of a child. Those actions may include paying some of the costs of the
artificial insemination process, taking the woman to the facility to be
inseminated, and helping to choose the baby's name. Moreover, if a
reasonable person would interpret the donor's actions as those of an
intended parent, the court should attribute constructive notice of that
fact to the artificially inseminated woman. Therefore, the court should
respect the donor's intentions and recognize him as the child's legal
father.
"6 See In re R.C., 775 P.2d at 35 (stating that the court will recognize an
agreement between a known sperm donor and an unmarried woman that the donor
will be treated as the father of the artificially conceived child).
327 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:11 (LexisNexis 2001) ("A sperm donor may
be liable for support only if he signs an agreement with the other parties to that
effect."); see also C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1994).
321 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that the
natural mother was the woman who intended to have the child conceived and who
intended to parent the child).
'2 Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to Nonlegal Lesbian
Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 433, 438-39 (2005).
... Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:
An Opportunityfor Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 323-27 (1990).
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C. Paternity by Biology 3'
Since the known sperm donor supplies the genetic material that
results in the child's creation, there should be a rebuttable presumption
that he is the legal father of the child. In order to rebut the presumption,
the woman or the sperm donor should have to prove that the sperm
donor never intended to parent the child. One way for the woman to
meet this burden of proof is to present evidence that the donor, by word
or deed, waived his parental rights to the child. The court should only
allow the presumption to be rebutted if it is in the best interests of the
child to so permit. It should only be considered to be in the child's best
interests if there is another person legally obligated or willing to parent
the child. Another way to satisfy the best interests of the child standard
should be for the woman to show that she is financially capable of
providing for the child.
d. Paternity by Function
Like the situations involving the paternity of the husband of an
artificially inseminated woman, the court should review the actions the
donor took after the child's conception and birth. If the known sperm
donor acted as a father to the child, with the permission of the artificially
inseminated woman, his paternity should be legally recognized."
Nevertheless, since the parties are not married or in a committed
relationship, the courts should strictly apply the functional parent
doctrine. Therefore, a man should not be deemed to be the father just
because he forms a relationship with the child. In some cases, a single
woman might permit the sperm donor to play a role in the child's life
because she wants her child to have a father figure. Her actions should
not result in the sperm donor being established as her child's legal
parent. In order to obtain parental status, the sperm donor should take
on all the attributes of fatherhood, including providing regular financial
support, visiting the child on a regular basis, and making decisions with
regards to the child's upbringing. The activities must all be done with the
consent of the artificially inseminated woman.
IX. CONCLUSION
The use of assisted reproductive technology, especially artificial
insemination, has increased. Traditionally, childless couples who could
not conceive chose to use assisted reproduction in order to create their
families. In most cases, women were artificially inseminated with their
husbands' sperm. The rise of male infertility has led more women to use
... A biological or genetic parent has been defined as "[a] person who shares a
genetic connection to a child. They are the contributor of genetic material that
creates a child." J.F. v. D.B., No. 15061-2003, 2004 WL 1570142, at *9 (Pa. Ct. Com.
Pl. Apr. 2, 2004).
3 This is the approach taken by the Court in In re RC., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo.
1989).
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donor sperm to conceive. Thus, there are now two men involved in the
artificial insemination process. Recently, more and more single women
have relied upon artificial insemination and other methods of assisted
reproduction to conceive children. Those women frequently conceive
using donor sperm.
The majority of states have statutes that allocate the paternal
obligations of the inseminated woman's husband and of the sperm
donor. Nonetheless, those statutes have not offered sufficient guidance
to the courts. Moreover, in the states that do not have statutes, the
outcomes of cases involving the paternity of artificially conceived
children have been inconsistent. Legislatures should pass laws that give
courts the flexibility to adjudicate the paternity of the inseminated
women's husbands and the sperm donors based upon the unique facts of
the individual cases. In its quest to designate a legal father for the
artificially conceived child the courts should be guided by the best
interests of the child standard. Relying on that standard, the courts
should make sure that the artificially conceived child has at least two
legal parents.
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